Mistakes I have made, seen, read or heard about

By JOHN HINTON

It takes time to become a good incident commander (IC). We all make mistakes at every level in our careers; it's part of the learning process. In this month's column, I'll examine some of the most common errors ICs make. Don't be surprised if you've committed some of these errors; I've made my fair share.

No. 1: Blurred Command
It doesn't happen very often, but when it does, "blurred command" surely puts the troops operating in the hazard zone at a disadvantage. Blurred command is any command not clearly identified; following are three types.

• No command: Multiple units arrive on the scene at or near the same time, and all fail to take command. This may be the result of initial-arrivers competing for tactical positions. Other conditions that can result in no command include poor, ineffective communications on the front end or lack of training among companies likely to run in with one another. For whatever reason, the end result of no command is freelancing.
• Multiple commands: Multiple first-arrivers each assume command. Occasionally, radio communications overlapping one another with no "order model" results in multiple commands. More likely, and more disturbing, is that turf wars or territorial battles lead to multiple commands. Whatever the cause, multiple commands are as dangerous as no command. Without an agreement in advance of the event on how command is to be transferred, hazard zone workers may be left with no real command to protect them. The result is often similar to that of a fireground with no command: freelancing.
• Poor view of the fireground: This third type falls into the category of blurred command if for no other reason than it describes the view command has of the fireground. First-arrivers often have little choice in the fireground position they assume; they must place themselves in a position to attack the fire. However, in some cases this may not be the best strategic position. Such an excuse cannot be extended to the second-arriving IC. ICs have a strategic responsibility. Second-arriving ICs (normally a battalion chief) must ensure they have a strategic view of the fireground, and they should set up the command post in a strategic and stationary location.
  In the end, who has command cannot be at issue. No command, multiple commands or a command post set up in poor location are sure ways to booger up operations. There should be only one command, clearly identified, in a strategic location. Period.

PHOTOS PAUL RAMIREZ One clearly identified command must exist, and the IC must control the scene through effective "command presence" — calm, direct and decisive communications.

No. 2: OverCompensation & Apprehension to Changing the Plan
These two separate mistakes are closely linked: Making either can lead to a bundle of problems, and they are often made together. First, overcompensation: Anytime an IC feels like they are trying too hard to make something work, they probably are. Trying harder to make something work when it isn't working can cause things to get even worse. Sometimes, by the time we arrive, events have occurred that make what we would like to do impossible. In these cases, we must accept conditions for what they are.

Overcompensation on the fireground is often a cover for a poor size-up. As an IC, you must apply logic to what can be an emotional event. Make your best judgment of what is going on and what it will take to deal with it.

That leads us to the apprehension some ICs harbor toward changing plans. Old advice is sometimes the best advice: Don't stick to an outdated plan. Newer ICs often equate a plan that must be changed with a plan that was faulty from the outset. This simply is not so. A changed plan is not by definition a weakened one. In fact, the survivability of our firefighters rests on our ability to keep our attack plan current with changing conditions. Focus on standards — conditions, actions and outcomes.

Misread conditions, poor situation evaluations and poor attack plans are major contributors to many firefighter fatalities. Overpowering these initial errors by unwarranted overcompensation compounds the problem and is dangerous, as is sticking to an outdated plan. I have witnessed a half-dozen or so fires over a 10-year period where "the way we have always done it" didn't work. Unique conditions can result from a variety of issues (i.e., construction, access, water supply). The IC must remain alert enough to adapt to anomalies.

Second-arriving ICs must ensure they set up the command post in a strategic and stationary location.

No. 3: Poor Communication or "Command Presence"
So much has been written about overall communication on the fireground that I want to spend some time talking about just one piece of it I occasionally see. And it is a big hitter. Even well-grounded command can come off as weak due to the lack of "presence." Difficult to describe but easily observed, "command presence" is essential to the effectiveness of the command process. The IC is in charge, and they must sound like it.

Timid commanders can cause doubt or even confusion in the minds of hazard zone workers. ICs who are reduced to a mere part of the communication process run the risk of losing control of that process. ICs take control of the fireground through communications. It follows, then, that ICs must control communications.

Being in control is not the same thing as being arrogant and hardheaded. ICs need to ask the right questions of hazard zone participants. However, communication is such an important part of the process that the IC must take absolute control of it; it can be left to no other. The IC must control the pace and direction of communications and insist on verifying orders through the "order model." The more command presence an IC can display, the easier it is to control the communication process. Fortunately, command presence can be learned, and tends to come naturally with time and experience.

In addition to strategic location, command posts must reveal a strategic view of the fireground.

No. 4: Failure to Forecast Needs
A common mistake among command officers is failure to manage what is going on now without losing sight of what will happen in 20 minutes or more. It pays to take the time necessary to forecast your resource needs based on your most pessimistic view of current events. For whatever reason, forecasting needs is harder for the new command officer. It may simply be explained by lack of experience, but it may also be due to a deeper tendency in our culture: "Don't call for help unless you are going to need it." This approach eventually leads to a fireground too poor in resources to operate safely. I often hear the complaint, especially with mutual-aid agreement jurisdictions, that calling for help early leads to a lot of useless dispatches. In short, the rule of thumb is to bring to the battle far more than needed, before it's needed. In the case of firefighting, it's OK to "fish with dynamite." Requesting plenty of resources to respond to the event is not overkill. Having them and not using them is far safer than needing them and not having them.

No. 5: Asking Too Much or Not Enough of Hazard Zone Workers
Expecting too much or too little from our personnel is more common than it should be. The technical competence of an IC is tied directly to their knowledge of the work to be delegated. The strength of our command system lies in the fact that most officers progress through the system in a linear fashion. That is to say, we were firefighters, pump and aerial operators and drivers prior to becoming officers. Battalion chiefs come from the ranks of our captains, captains from lieutenants and so on. The "layers" of an organization vary depending on its size, but the power of the system is grounded in this linear progression through the ranks. Each step lays a foundation for the next. Time in rank is secondary to what is learned while in that rank. I have seen exceptions, but in general those with a good grasp of how to accomplish the work (working in the trenches) are better equipped at directing that work as officers. This connection among the work, the worker and boss is key to our ability as officers to know what tasks to ask for and how long each task should take to accomplish. Those making decisions on the fireground must have a respect for what the work should look like. Asking too little of the worker can be as dysfunctional as asking for too much — although asking for too much often enough can be catastrophic.

An example of getting too little out of a worker: when an IC loads a tactical position with more help than is required to do the work. More is not always better; in fact, it can make the work more difficult and dangerous than necessary. You can observe this mistake when you see multiple crews exit from a small structure and wonder how they kept from running over each other inside (an event described by firefighters as "bottle clanging"). Too much help can slow operations. We don't talk about it much because it is rare, but when it does happen, it isn't that subtle.

A more common IC error: requesting work that is impossible, or nearly so, for a single company to accomplish. Most often, when this mistake is made, it's in the area of support operations. Ventilation, forcible entry, search and rescue, utility control and salvage work are often lumped together or out of sequence (priority). Suppression, which is the portion of the work most recognized from the street, actually constitutes a small percentage of hazard zone operations. Support work is the bigger part of the labor in the hazard zone. It must be delegated in manageable, sensible sizes.

Several factors contribute to "goofy" work assignments on the fireground: lack of experience, judgment, training and ability may be contributing factors, but more often, the boss has underestimated the importance of staying connected to both the work and the worker. Delegation of work assignments in the hazard zoneis a serious business, and ICs must treat it as such.

Conclusions
Taking command, and doing so from a strategic position, is the first (and basic) function of the command process. Developing a plan, and being willing and able to change that plan based on current and forecasted conditions, are equally essential. The IC commands through communication, which is most effective when the IC displays a command presence. Knowing the work, doing the work and commanding how that work is accomplished are separate abilities. The trick is to stay connected to each piece of our work as we advance in rank. The best ICs I worked for on the fireground had a good idea of what I was going through in the trenches. The easiest way I have found to stay connected to the work we love is to keep asking questions of the workers and take the time to listen to their answers.

John Hinton has been with the Phoenix Fire Department for more than 29 years and is currently a deputy chief and shift commander. His duties include training recruits and active firefighters.