5 truths that affect air supply & work cycle management

Here in my neck of the woods, it's often said, "You had better be doing things right when things go wrong." This applies to everything we do — checking our equipment daily, maintaining skills through training, performing on the fireground in a manner that mirrors our training standards and driving the way we should (with our seatbelts fastened and at a sane speed), to name a few. In short, doing things right for those times when things go wrong is simply part of remaining fit for duty.

We can apply the same philosophy to work cycles. Managing our work in the hazard zone is as fundamentally sound as buckling up when we drive our rigs; just as seatbelts become a big deal in crashes, air supply becomes an especially big deal when things go wrong on the fireground. As simple as this may sound, many departments employ a "work until you drop (or run out of air)" approach. This approach has a powerful attraction (even a mystique), and is embedded in fire-service tradition. However, this philosophy also discounts the need for timely relief of our working crews and pushes our members too close to the edge, especially if things go wrong.

Using work cycles to better manage air supply makes sense. However, we face some very real obstacles to implementing realistic work cycles on the fireground. An examination of some of the truths regarding our jobs, as well as our personalities, can give us a better idea of those obstacles and how we should deal with them.

PHOTO PAUL RAMIREZ Effective work cycle and air supply management relies on a simple, sane and identifiable system to hand off unfinished work. Defined work-rest cycles can aid in eliminating a "work until you drop" philosophy.

TRUTH NO. 1: OFFENSIVE FIRES GENERALLY END WITH OFFENSIVE CONCLUSIONS
On a recent trip out of town, I heard for the first time about a common tactic in some rural areas, particularly for house fires: The first company on scene does a "quick search," then withdraws to an exterior position due to the lack of resources to sustain an offensive firefight. I was told the firefighters refer to these fires as "offensive." For our purposes, there's no need to split hairs in an attempt to define what constitutes an offensive fire; such a discussion can easily stand on its own. Instead, we'll define an offensive fire as one that, upon our arrival, we intend to put out using an interior attack. This definition puts us all on the same page.

Offensive firefights tend to last 10–20 minutes and end with an offensive conclusion. This is a good thing; it means we are generally right when we decide to enter burning structures, and generally effective when we do so. Air supply and crew makeup/fitness are seldom challenged in offensive fires, which are more often residential rather than large, commercial fires. As we get better at choosing our strategy, we're more likely to end the firefight using the strategy with which we began. That is, the need to shift from an offensive to a defensive strategy becomes less common as we get better at figuring out which fires we can safely put out from the inside.

But our success has a downside, too: Repeated offensive successes can cause us to discount the importance of maintaining safe air supplies and using standard work cycles.

Success also explains, in part, why our members get into trouble more often while completing the second tactical priority (firefighting) than they do the first (search and rescue). Because we generally are successful, we develop the habit of ending the fight with the same strategy we began. However, sometimes an offensive fire doesn't end in 20 minutes, and sometimes, it may require a defensive conclusion. For those fires, work cycles and air management pay high dividends. 

TRUTH NO. 2: FIREFIGHTERS DON'T LIKE TO LEAVE WORK UNFINISHED
On occasion, firefighters may have trouble finding a mop for the dirty floor, or a rag to wipe down the dusty truck, but they have no problem finding work on the fireground.

Once engaged, they tend to want to finish what they started. A "must-finish" attitude is a good thing, but it also poses a challenge to work-cycle management when the work on the fireground doesn't present itself in neatly packaged units. The real problem occurs when the work required extends the firefighter's work cycle/air supply or, worse yet, when the fire overwhelms the attack. We all agree firefighters should not have to fight their way to safety. But we should also agree that if they must retreat, they should possess the reserve air and energy to do so safely. This requires them to manage their air and their work in a measured, sane manner. Staying too long to "finish" the work is a dangerous habit.

TRUTH NO. 3: FIREFIGHTERS WILL SEEK THE SEAT OF THE FIRE
This statement is so obvious, it sounds silly. We will mount an attack from the direction (door) we entered the structure, regardless of where that door is located in relation to the fire. This strategy is rarely a problem in residential fires, but in a large structure, an attack from the "wrong" entrance can extend work cycles and challenge air supplies. Entering and traveling deep into a structure extends our use of air and challenges our ability to exit the door through which we entered. Sometimes we get inside so deep that the only way to exit safely is to put out the fire. This is a big time gamble. We should make no attack from so deep inside a structure that we must extinguish the fire to exit safely.

We must remind firefighters that if they can't get to the seat of the fire while maintaining a safe depth, they must exit, regroup and re-evaluate the plan. Access can be the most critical fireground factor, and it is difficult to compensate for a poor choice. In my department, we no longer extend the length of attack lines into "large span truss, big box" burning buildings, but instead mount the attack from a different direction. We just can't figure out a way to outperform a finite air supply.

TRUTH NO. 4: RELIEVING A COMPANY IS EASIER THAN RESCUING IT
This is another no-brainer. However, relieving companies is a big time-deployment issue and presents a constant challenge for the incident commander.

Reasons for relieving a company in a timely manner include:

• The firefight may last longer than a single air pack;
• The firefight may extend past one safe work cycle;
• Firefighters are reluctant to leave unfinished work, particularly if they are "almost" done;
• No two crewmembers on the same crew are physically the same, nor do they use air at the same rate; and
• The deployment model should protect those who need it most. Fitness limits cannot be tested safely inside the hazard zone.

If these statements make sense, then it makes sense to provide a way to safely hand off unfinished work. For us and many other departments, this is what On-Deck is all about. It provides a framework to manage a critical fireground reality: Support is necessary to safely sustain an attack. If work cycles and air management are important, then we must implement a simple, sane and identifiable system to hand off unfinished work.

PHOTO PAUL RAMIREZ Work cycles allow time for rehab and rest before crews are "recycled" back into the hazard zone.

TRUTH NO. 5: AIR SUPPLY & WORK CYCLES ARE INSEPARABLE
Clearly, air supply and work cycles go hand-in-hand. What's not so obvious is that they're also separate issues: First, how long can you expect top performance from your personnel in the hot zone? Second, how big should their air bottles be? The answer to both questions depends on a variety of local issues. One of the most interesting and intense conversations my organization ever engaged in resulted from the death of one of our firefighters who ran out of air while fighting a supermarket fire. It will come as no surprise that many of our members argued for a 50 percent to 100 percent increase in our air supply. (We operate with 30-minute bottles.)

Such a debate must be tempered with a conversation about how long we expect members to perform at maximum effort in the firefight. This firefighter's death was a direct result of running out of air, but contributing factors — building construction, extent of the fire, access difficulty, length of attack lines needed and used, multiple knockdowns and extended work cycles — were equally if not more important. In the end, whatever air supply your department chooses, one constant remains: It is a finite amount. As we told our members, we can strap a blimp to them, but the real question is, "How big is big enough?" There may not be one right answer; as I mentioned, the decision must be tied to local issues. For us, due to the fact that we have the resources, and that our climate is extreme, using 30-minute air bottles and 10-minute work cycles makes sense. We are further hedging our bet by testing an "emergency egress air system." (We will report preliminary results on this system sometime this fall.)

WHERE WE'RE AT WITH WORK CYCLES
There is no way to attack fire half-heartedly; we must "get after it" offensively when the conditions warrant it. Nevertheless, our work should not be completed while ignoring low-air alarms. (Low-air alarms are not a suggestion to leave the building; they are the manufacturer's indication that the user is running out of air.) My department sends members inside more than once — but only within the guidelines of a defined work-rest cycle. (We use the term "recycle" for crews re-entering the hazard zone.) In the past, we often went into buildings as deep as we needed to go to reach the seat of the fire. We feel we have been lucky too often to continue to do so.

During the past year, my department has made some excellent progress in terms of air and work-cycle management. Moving from a "work until you drop" approach to a real system of work cycles presents challenges. Implementing a system that defines how to hand off unfinished work helped in our transition.

CONCLUSION
Regardless of the size of your department, your deployment model and your resource capabilities are tied together. In other words, the deployment model used is directly related to the resources that can be delivered to the scene. It only makes sense that departments adjust their deployment models to match the available resources. (We all live in the real world.) However, in the end, our safety and effectiveness largely depend on the way we manage those resources once they enter the hazard zone.

Firefighting is not a sporting event, and using everything we have on the fireground may leave us with nothing in reserve when things go wrong. If we take the approach that we work until the work is done (or collapse trying), over a period time and with a little bad luck, we may eventually have to cash that check. Managing air supplies and work cycles and keeping a system in place to hand off unfinished work can position our troops for survival when things go wrong.

The inherent risks involved in firefighting require us to develop strategies that create safety margins for our hazard zone workers. This includes not wearing them out completely in the hazard zone. We simply can't bet our lives on things always going right. If for no other reason, air management and work cycles should make sense for those times when things don't go as planned.

John Hinton has been with the Phoenix Fire Department for more than 29 years and is currently a deputy chief and shift commander. His duties include training recruits and active firefighters.