By Jake Wagman
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)
Copyright 2007 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Inc.
All Rights Reserved
ST. LOUIS, Mo. — Hundreds of emergency responders converged on Busch Stadium in August to test how they would handle a major disaster: A radical militia group, they were told, had released deadly chlorine gas into a capacity crowd, sending thousands of panicked Cardinals fans into the street.
Was St. Louis ready?
The Police Department was, but the Fire Department was not, according to a confidential draft report that also faulted some state officials.
The document saves its strongest criticisms for the Fire Department, whose reluctance to cooperate with the numerous other agencies involved would have, according to the report, led to a higher death toll.
Specifically, the Fire Department was cited for refusal to participate in a “unified command” - disaster lingo for sharing control with other agencies.
“Lack of willingness by SLFD leadership to engage in unified command hampered effective communication and command,” says the report, by a private firm that ran the drill. “In a real incident, it would contribute to greater loss of life.”
The Fire Department was so isolated, according to the report, that a runner had to relay messages between the department and other agencies.
The report was written by the L-3 Communications Titan Group, a Virginia-based government contractor. The drill was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Sam Simon, city director of public safety, said he has already discussed the report’s recommendations with fire officials and others. He acknowledged there were “some command and control issues” that needed to be addressed.
“The idea of the drill is not to look good,” Simon said. “The idea of the drill is to learn.”
Simon cautioned that the final version of the report - which he would not release because he said it is classified - contains suggestions and recommendations, not criticism.
Delays, music at issue
In the draft report, the Fire Department was faulted for delays in setting up decontamination centers and for playing music in the vehicle that served as a command base.
Fire Chief Sherman George refused to discuss the report.
He did respond in writing on the department’s website, playing down the issue of shared command. “The incident itself never actually left our area of expertise,” it stated.
The two-day drill was one of a number of similar exercises at ballparks across the nation - including Shea Stadium in New York and PNC Park in Pittsburgh - paid for by the Department of Homeland Security. On Saturday, AT&T Park in San Francisco, home of this year’s All-Star Game, will host a drill.
An elaborate back story framed the drill at Busch. Organizers conjured up a fictitious villain, the “Golden Eagle Militia,” which stole a chlorine tanker truck and, just before game time, blew it up where Highway 40 (Interstate 64) skirts the southern edge of the ballpark.
In real life, the Fire Department has expressed concerns about that proximity of the highway to the stadium, with the distance less than the space between the baseball field’s bases.
The drill included a detailed timeline that envisioned future threats - 10:28 p.m., an anonymous caller said “the brewery is next” - and “riotlike” conditions at local hospitals.
There were plenty of “victims” - thousands of volunteers who were given a goody bag and food voucher to take part in the exercise. Some wore makeup to simulate injuries.
“Of course, it was a drill, but it was a very realistic drill,” said Mark S. James, director of the Missouri Department of Public Safety.
Info center jammed
One of the state agencies being tested was the Missouri Information Analysis Center, formed in late 2005 to serve as a clearinghouse for officials to share disaster information.
During the drill, the report found, several employees were absent, causing a communications backlog and delay in processing intelligence information.
“If there had been multiple events occurring throughout the state of Missouri, it would have been almost impossible for MIAC to function effectively,” the report says.
A spokesman for the agency said the center, based in Jefferson City, has since clarified procedures and made plans to add employees.
At the scene, the report says, the Fire Department “was unable to establish a functioning decontamination area for civilians in timely manner,” forcing rescuers to turn away volunteers playing the role of contaminated victims.
George, in his statement, blamed the delay in part on the organizers of the test. He said they forced fire officials to take part in a predrill briefing at Soldiers Memorial, not giving them time to set up.
Other sections of the draft focused on what it called the Fire Department’s lack of cooperation with other agencies.
At one point, according to the report, a member of the Police Department went to the Fire Department’s command vehicle, seeking to form a joint command. The fire official, who was not named, “refused to engage,” making the Fire Department a “nonparticipant” in the command structure set up by the other agencies.
George says now that during the incident, there was never any clear indication that unified command was necessary.
Either way, the Fire Department and the other agencies communicated mostly by a messenger going between command trailers, according to the report. The lack of communication resulted in events that could have had serious consequences in a real emergency.
For instance, the first arriving police units were “quickly overrun by exiting victims” because, according to the report, Fire Department entry teams did not communicate their information with law enforcement.
“In a real event, responder safety and victim care would have been negatively impacted,” the report says.
Police are lauded
The Police Department’s performance was labeled “exemplary.” Police officials declined to comment on the report.
“It is inappropriate for the Metropolitan Police Department to discuss assessments of another public safety agency made by an independent outside group,” said spokesman Richard Wilkes.
“However, the department has had several real-life experiences, most recently the ice storm and the severe storm in July, where communications between the police and fire departments were seamless,” Wilkes added.
Other rebukes contained in the report were minor. It admonished some firefighters for not wearing the proper protective gear, such as gloves and breathing equipment, and recommended that the department not allow music to play in the vehicle serving as its command station.
Busch Stadium ushers were cited for trying to move certain “nonambulatory” victims without having the proper medical training. “Although this commitment to lifesaving efforts is to be commended,” the report states, “ushers put victims at risk of additional injuries.”
Not all the comments were criticisms. The report found that the Fire Department’s hazardous-materials team showed “proficiency and ability to perform well under extreme circumstances.”
A spokesman from the Titan Group, which wrote the report, declined to comment on it.
Edward D. Clark, a homeland security consultant near Kansas City, said it’s not uncommon during a disaster drill for the agencies involved to debate how command should be handled.
“One of the main reasons you run exercises is to identify those situations,” said Clark, a special forces officer in the Army Reserve. “Even though it may seem to the public these type of things shouldn’t be happening, it’s better if it comes out in the exercise.”
James, the state public safety director, said he did not agree with the assessment that the Fire Department was uncooperative.
“I think it’s an exaggeration, frankly,” James said, adding that he thought some of the comments about the department were “out of bounds” and of a personal nature.
But Simon, the fire chief’s immediate supervisor at City Hall, said personalities often do play a role in emergency response.
“Even if you have the police chief and fire chief that are beer-drinking buddies,” Simon said, “it’s always an issue.”