Ten years ago, Wilmington, Delaware, firefighters responded to a rowhouse fire that, on its face, presented the kind of challenge they had handled countless times before — a “bread-and-butter” fire, as they say.
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But the Sept. 24, 2016, fire would become one of the most consequential incidents in the department’s history. Lt. Christopher Leach and Senior Firefighter Jerry Fickes were killed in the line of duty. Senior Firefighter Ardythe Hope died 67 days later, on Dec. 1, 2016, from complications of her injuries. Firefighter Brad Speakman, Senior Firefighter Terrance Tate and Lt. John Cawthray were seriously injured during rescue efforts.
Consistent with protocol, the three fallen firefighters were posthumously promoted one rank.
What happened
Shortly before 3 a.m., the initial alarm was dispatched for a structure fire in a rowhouse located in the Canby Park neighborhood of Wilmington. This community was originally constructed in 1944, developed as part of the post-World War II building boom.
From a firefighting perspective, the type III construction rowhouse presented a known and normal challenge — one that firefighters around the country respond to every day.
The first-in crews entered the unit with hoselines to find and extinguish the fire.
The NIOSH report indicates the incident commanders were aware that the middle-of-the-rowhouse’s occupants made it out the rear of the structure prior to the fire department’s arrival. There was, however, confusion on the 911 calls about whether everyone was out. The original caller, who was an occupant, reported that one family member had gone back inside.
The first-arriving companies were told by someone in the front that there were still occupants inside. That information proved false.
Shortly after Leach and Hope entered the home, the floor beneath them collapsed and they dropped into the basement. In an attempt the rescue the firefighters, Fickes entered the basement and found Leach. He was attempting to remove Leach when a subsequent collapse trapped them both.
Leach and Fickes were pronounced deceased on the scene of the fire. Hope was rescued but later died from burn complications.
Contributing factors
It was later determined that the Lakeview Road unit had been remodeled — a fact the firefighters certainly did not know. While such updates don’t always present a problem, in this case, the remodel included removal of a load-bearing wall in the basement. Investigators determined that removal was the cause of the collapse. Had that wall not been removed, firefighters would at least have had more time to locate, confine and extinguish the fire.
Adding to the recklessness of the tragedy, it was determined that the fire had been intentionally set, and one of the residents was later arrested and charged with arson. She plead guilty to individual counts of second-degree murder, arson and assault and was sentenced to thirty years in prison.
The fire department and the firefighters’ families were left struggling to cope with such a senseless tragedy.
As one would expect, a lawsuit followed in 2018. However, as one might not expect, the lawsuit named the city of Wilmington as well as two mayors and two fire chiefs — but not the arsonist. The lawsuit primarily targeted minimum-staffing and brownout policies as directly or indirectly attributable to the deaths.
According to the Fire Law blog, “The suit attributed the deaths and injuries to the city’s policy of understaffing engines and ladders in violation of NFPA 1710 as well as a policy alternatively referred to as ‘rolling bypasses’ or ‘conditional company closures’ that browned out units to save money on overtime. It claimed that the city’s actions were so outrageous that they violated the 14th Amendment’s due process clause.”
In 2020, the lawsuit was dismissed in trial court and appealed by the plaintiffs.
In 2021, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal.
Problems identified
To better understand what went wrong that day, we can turn first to the NIOSH report. It is important to recognize that NIOSH reports look at raw death (or significant injury) causation material, not at fire cause or fire contributing factors. NIOSH focuses on department policy and training/performance as they relate to the death/injury causation.
The NIOSH report identified the following 10 contributing factors:
- Sliding glass door open on Side Charlie
- Lack of scene size-up and risk assessment
- Lack of incident management and Command Safety
- Lack of an incident action plan
- Inappropriate fireground tactics for below grade fire
- Lack of company/crew integrity
- Lack of personnel accountability system
- Lack of rapid intervention crew(s)
- Ineffective fireground communications
- Lack of professional development for fire officers and fire fighters
Particularly sad for us is that NONE of the 10 contributing factors above are new to the fire service. We continue to see these same details appear time after time in after action and NIOSH reports across the country. Beyond the construction detail mentioned above, there are no epiphanies with the Wilmington NIOSH report. These amount to problems identified. The hallmark of actual lessons learned lies in what the department does about the problems identified — in this case, the 10 factors above.
Lessons learned for WFD
Although a formal department report does not appear to exist for us to review, I was able to verify some information to get a sense for today’s Wilmington Fire Department. That information, combined with the NIOSH report, paints a picture for how the department has responded to this tragedy through policy changes.
Staffing changes (lawsuit related): While station brownouts were part of the lawsuit, the WFD no longer uses brownouts to reduce costs. Additionally, all box alarm dispatches were increased to four engines and two ladder trucks (previously three and one, respectively), which at least partially addresses the on-scene staffing concerns brought in the lawsuit. Increased response assets — a lesson learned.
Operational and training changes (hits all NIOSH factors): Utilizing the 360-degree survey on every incident became the standard and additional training on scene size-up, and building construction training was provided to all members. SOPs recognizing flow path management and transitional attack were implemented. Changes in tactical operation SOPS — lessons learned.
Fire Officer Training standards were established, with the first step being after-the-fact (meaning not required for promotion but required after promotion). Fire Officer 1 is now required for all lieutenants, Fire Officer 2 for all captains and Fire Officer 3 for all chief officers. Additional incident management training and command simulations above the SOP changes was provided. Improved training standards — lessons learned.
Changes in incident command functionality included utilizing incident command boxes and refocusing on the accountability system. To assist incident commanders, incident timers are now being used in the dispatch center to prompt incident commanders.
While there was a PASS system in place (tags hung on apparatus doors), it appears that the incident accelerated so quickly that the tags were not collected and in possession of the incident commander, complicating the identification process. Collecting these tags would have been the RIT crew’s assignment upon their arrival — they were not yet on the scene. Two things were done to address these issues: 1. Each district chief now uses a Velcro board with each company’s roster for the day, and all company officers log their crews into CAD at the start of the shift for tracking and 2. The fourth engine that was added to the initial assignment is automatically RIT. Changes in personnel tracking and changes to dedicate RIT on the initial assignment — lessons learned.
Specifically addressing factor 9, the WFD switched to the state of Delaware radio system in 2025, moving away from the city of Wilmington radio system that was prone to dead spots and other failures. Changes that result in improved communication capabilities — lessons learned.
Likely one of the most tangible and expensive improvements for basic operation and command training, was the WFD’s construction of its first-ever live-burn facility in 2024. All members participate in live-fire training twice a year at that facility. Prior, there was no requirement for members to attend any live burn training once they had graduated from the fire academy. Investments in training infrastructure and overall systemic improvement — lessons learned.
Change in action: These policy changes are true measures of lessons learned. While anecdotally we know this kind of change is meant to improve safety and is necessary, we often don’t get the opportunity to see a cost/benefit analysis of these kinds of lessons learned, in real time. In 2025, the WFD had a similar residential fire about 10 doors down from the 2016 fatal fire. A 360 was completed and the basement fire was attacked from the ground level on Side C. During fire attack, the first-floor joists were discovered to be burned through. Had crews charged in the front door and across that floor, they likely would have had another tragedy — TRULY a lesson learned.
Always remember
We hear the phrases “always remember” and “never forget” a lot. Unfortunately, the words seem to fall on deaf ears when we repeatedly identify the same problems, call after call, city after city.
While the WFD demonstrated the learned lesson in the 2025 call referenced above, the 2021 Rock Falls, Illinois, LODD had many of the exact problems identified as had been done five years earlier in Wilmington — no 360, mayday dysfunction, training and operational lapses. As I read the Illinois report, I felt like I was reading the Wilmington report. This is not a one-off phenomenon. Are we really remembering, or just providing lip service?
Remember, our actions speak louder than our words! As the WFD does, most departments recognize their own LODDs with annual remembrance ceremonies and maybe a mention in recruit class training. Some departments immerse themselves in the lessons learned (e.g. Charleston, FDNY), making generational systemic changes to ensure that the tragic events do not occur in vain.
In addition to the annual remembrance ceremony, the WFD has for the past few years held a training symposium on the anniversary of the Lakeview Road incident. The 2026 symposium will host speaker Lt. James Dowdell, FDNY Rescue Battalion.
We have a solemn responsibility to do everything we can to avoid firefighter death and injuries. This is absolutely a dangerous profession, and bad things will always happen. My challenge to you: Do not allow those bad things to define us, but rather refine us.
The final measure of remembrance is the lesson learned — ensuring that the problems we identify with these tragedies affect change, not just in our fire station, but in the fire service as a whole.
