By Jeremy Kohler
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)
Copyright 2007 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Inc.
All Rights Reserved
ST. LOUIS, Mo. — Five years ago tonight, two city firefighters were killed separately in one relatively small blaze that raised serious questions about tactics and gear.
Fire Chief Sherman George promised the department would probe for lessons to be learned from the deaths of Robert Morrison and Derek Martin, both 38 and of Rescue Squad 1.
But if department leaders found lessons, they never - to this day - shared them with the rank and file.
At noon today, in Poelker Park downtown, the fire department will hold a memorial service for Martin and Morrison. But neither firefighters nor the public have ever been given an official account of how the deaths occurred.
“It doesn’t help the department when you have two people die in the fire and nobody knows how they died,” said Ken Sturma, secretary and treasurer of Firefighters Union Local 73. “There is no way to critique the fire if you don’t know what happened.”
George did not make himself available to comment on Wednesday. Capt. Derrick Phillips, a department spokesman, said a report of the department’s investigation into the fire is now complete. Copies are ready to be distributed to firehouses, he said.
Phillips said the report was “never meant to be released to the public. It was meant for training.”
But no specific lessons from the fire have yet been applied to training, Phillips said. The report will form the basis for sessions with firefighters that remain on the drawing board, he said.
Phillips said the department has made at least one change based on problems at the fire at Gravois Refrigeration, 2241 Gravois Avenue.
A major problem that night was a babble of radio transmissions, some coming from other incidents, that drowned out a distress call reporting that Morrison was in trouble.
Phillips said a dispatcher has now been specifically assigned to monitor on-scene communications.
When asked Wednesday to detail other changes made since the fire, the department sent a five-page statement pointing to equipment upgrades and training sessions that Phillips agreed were either routine or mandatory and not necessarily tied to the Gravois fire.
The department also now uses “rapid intervention teams” - special units dedicated to rescuing trapped rescuers - an innovation that was in the works two years before the Gravois fire.
The statement touted George’s efforts to reduce a host of other problems, from firefighter heart attacks to traffic crashes involving fire equipment.
In a letter this week to the Post-Dispatch, George said he has taken a “proactive, hands-on approach to the safety of our firefighters.” Under his watch, George said, fires, civilian deaths and firefighter injuries have been in steep decline.
Although he did not name a specific instance, George said the news media have deliberately misled the public and unfairly criticized him and the department.
Findings reported before
The Post-Dispatch obtained a copy of the fire department’s final report. It is virtually identical to a draft obtained by the newspaper more than three years ago, the findings of which were outlined in a story on Jan. 23, 2004.
The report found:
- Firefighters failed to ventilate the building, a key step that clears smoke and hot gases for the safety of those working inside. Ladder trucks weren’t correctly parked for access to the roof.
- Two separate Maydays - including one by Martin - went unnoticed on busy radio channels. One was about the same time an order was given by radio to evacuate.
- At least one caller told dispatchers the building “went boom,” but firefighters were never warned of the possibility of an explosion. If they knew, the report suggests, they might have recognized there was a gas leak that made the blaze more dangerous.
- “Rampant ... freelancing” by firefighters - at least four of whom were alone at times inside - violated a well-established “buddy” rule.
- Two firefighters from Lake of the Ozarks, riding along on Rescue 1, entered the building without the incident commander’s permission and wearing St. Louis air tanks, contrary to rules. Morrison and his usual partner had split up, each one teamed with an observer.
- Some rescuers were unfamiliar with operating a thermal imaging camera to find downed victims in dense smoke.
- Air tanks weren’t full in some companies’ breathing equipment. Morrison was in the building a short time before his low-air alarm sounded.
- Jobs lost in budget cuts left battalion chiefs without the extra eyes and ears of aides, as well as reduced the ranks of inspectors, meaning fewer checks for hazards.
In a news conference the day of the 2004 Post-Dispatch story, George’s boss, Public Safety Director Sam Simon, called the report a “learning tool for us and for the firefighters of today and tomorrow.”
George declined to hand out copies of the report that day, saying Mayor Francis Slay still hadn’t been able to see it. More than three years have passed and the report stayed secret.
Exactly why remained unclear on Wednesday. Phillips, speaking for George, said Simon did not give the chief permission to release the report internally until October. There was no explanation for why it was not released then.
Simon, when called for comment, referred questions to Ed Rhode, a Slay spokesman.
Rhode said Simon never knew the report had not yet been released.
George could have released it on his own, Rhode said, but he didn’t seek Simon’s permission to do so until October.