Highlights:
- Fire occured on Dec. 7, 1946.
- Deadliest hotel fire in U.S. history — 119 fatalities in a building advertised as being fireproof.
- Fire started on the third-floor corridor and extended upward through a single, open stair shaft.
- 385 firefighters, 22 engines, 11 ladders responded; ladders only reached the eighth floor, forcing daring horizontal‐ladder and life-net rescues.
- The fire was one of two that led President Harry S. Truman to convene a National Conference on Fire Prevention.
- NFPA 101 was upgraded to include mandatory enclosed stairwells, self-closing guest-room doors, sprinklers and limits on “fireproof” marketing
How did the Winecoff Hotel fire begin?
Shortly after 3:15 a.m. on Dec. 7, 1946, a mattress and chair, temporarily stored in the west third-floor hallway, ignited, most likely from a discarded cigarette, though arson tied to a late-night card game was also rumored. A bellboy had gone to the fifth floor to help an occupant and noticed the fire, and was quickly cut off by the spreading flames.
The only call to the fire department did not come until 3:42 a.m., when the night manager finally reached dispatch after trying to alert guests by telephone. No automatic building alarm ever sounded.
Flames and super-heated gases climbed the open stairway and ignited burlap wallcoverings, carpets and room transoms floor-by-floor.
The Winecoff Hotel fire timeline
- 3:43 a.m.: First-due engine and ladder on scene within 30 seconds of dispatch; occupants jump from windows
- 3:44 a.m.: Second alarm
- 3:49 a.m.: Third alarm
- 4:02 a.m.: General alarm with mutual aid
Key challenges during the Winecoff Hotel fire
One of the Winecoff’s most crippling liabilities was its single, unenclosed central stairwell, the lone path of exit for 15 floors. Once flames reached the third-floor landing, the open stairway acted like a chimney, drawing heat and smoke upward and cutting off every escape route above the fire floor. Corridors filled with toxic gases within minutes, forcing occupants to retreat into guestrooms or to windows. Guests had opened windows seeking fresh air and rescue, further enabling the draft of fresh air to the fire. Except for the top two floors, doors and transoms were consumed, and guests who opened windows for air only intensified the draft feeding the flames. Investigators later linked open transoms directly to the ignition of individual rooms and their contents.
Nearly every surface in those corridors was fuel: painted burlap on the walls, thick wool carpets over felt pads, layers of wallpaper and wood doors capped with open transoms. These finishes supported rapid flame spread and generated intense radiant heat.
Marketed as “absolutely fireproof,” the hotel lacked sprinklers, detectors, self-closing doors, and standpipes above the lobby. With no alarm to raise the alert, flames spread for 25 minutes after a bellboy first saw smoke at 3:15 a.m.; the lone call to firefighters didn’t reach dispatch until 3:42 a.m., after the night manager’s failed attempts to phone guests.
Firefighters faced tight streets, a 10-foot alley and 85-foot ladders that reached only the eighth floor. They bridged windows with ladders from a nearby building, but most guests remained unreachable. The fire spread while nearly 300 guests slept. With no alarms and the stairwell quickly cut off, panic spread and crowds at the windows soon overwhelmed first-arriving crews.
Why the Winecoff Hotel fire lessons matter
The Winecoff disaster teaches several enduring lessons: a “fireproof” structure still needs life-safety features; every minute counts — the 27-minute alarm delay made upper floors unsurvivable; and high-rise tactics must match the building, with aerial reach, horizontal laddering and roof-top options preplanned.
- They underpin today’s protected-egress rules — multiple enclosed stairs, self-closing fire-rated doors and the ban on transoms.
- They drove the 1948 revision of NFPA 101 to mandate sprinklers, detection, and strict flame-spread limits in high-rise lodging.
- They remind incident commanders to factor apparatus reach versus building height into preplans, especially where adjacent roofs allow horizontal ladders.
- They demonstrate how even a brief alarm delay can be catastrophic when no automatic systems compensate for human error.
Read more about the Winecoff Hotel fire
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