Reading social media comments related to the news of six Maine fire departments being cited for the deadly Searsmont lumber mill fire and explosion, I am seeing several versions of the same reaction: “They’re just volunteers.” But that argument doesn’t hold up
To recap, on May 15, 2026, nearly 300 firefighters from 46 regional agencies responded to a fire and explosion at Robbins Lumber. Morrill firefighter Andrew Cross died at the scene. Searsmont Assistant Chief Wayne Woodbury died a month later, and mill co-owner Alden Robbins died in July. More than a dozen others were injured.
All six of the initial-responding departments — Appleton, Belmont, Lincolnville, Montville, Morrill and Searsmont — were cited because they could not keep track of their firefighters at the incident. Five were also cited over PPE, including breathing apparatus.
| READ MORE: Normalization of deviance: When unsafe becomes ‘just how we do it’
On Nov. 10, the state waived nearly all of the roughly $108,000 in proposed penalties so the departments could focus their limited resources on fixing the problems.
A large fine would likely have come out of the same budget that needs to pay for training and gear. The state says the departments have corrected the cited items and that it is helping with training on tracking systems.
What NIOSH found
The NIOSH investigation describes a fire that was not what it appeared to be. The 20-by-60-foot silo was an oxygen-limiting design that the mill had used since 1993. Neither facility employees nor responding firefighters recognized that or that the kiln-dried shavings and residual sawdust inside posed a combustible dust explosion hazard.
The report’s findings on command and accountability are the ones that connect to the citations. The departments had trained firefighters to hang accountability tags on a ring at the first-arriving apparatus. That system was not activated. After the blast, the individual departments checked their own people, but a complete accountability process did not identify one firefighter as missing for about two hours. His remains were later found near the silo beneath burning material.
| READ MORE: The accountability gap: What we tolerate becomes our culture
NIOSH also found that the first-due department had no formal pre-incident plan for the facility, even though departments had done annual walk-throughs. And while the owners and employees stood nearby and answered questions, they were never brought into unified command.
“Just volunteers” is not an excuse
Some of the online discussion about the Maine story has focused on the volunteer classification. The suggestion is that a small, unpaid department can’t be held to the same standards as a department with paid staff. Volunteer departments often run on thin budgets and limited training hours, with members who work full-time jobs elsewhere
However, saying they are “just volunteers” is not an excuse to shrink away from training and existing SOPs.
Here is what “just volunteers” gets wrong:
- The hazard doesn’t check the staffing model. A silo does not explode more gently because the crew standing next to it is unpaid. The two firefighters who died at Robbins Lumber were volunteers, and they deserved the same protection as anyone else on the scene.
- Most of the failures NIOSH described are not budget failures. An accountability system existed but was not activated. Firefighters walked through the facility every year but never wrote a plan for it. Owners and employees standing nearby were never brought into command. Those are habits and discipline, and they cost time, not money. Hanging a tag on a ring costs nothing.
- Fire doesn’t track accountability. Nearly 300 firefighters from 46 departments worked this incident side by side. Accountability only works if everyone on the fireground uses it. A standard that applies to some of the people operating there is not a standard.
- “Just” quietly lowers the value of the member. It is often said as sympathy. But it treats a volunteer’s life as worth a lower standard of care than a career firefighter’s, and it lets towns, counties and chiefs off the hook for training and planning they owe the people they send into a burning building.
What we can do today
First and foremost, stop using “just volunteers” as an excuse. That goes for critics and commenters, and it goes for us in the industry as well. Anyone in a department, paid or unpaid, who reaches for the phrase to explain a lapse is lowering the bar before anyone has asked.
The word that matters is not volunteer or career. It is professional. Professionalism is a standard of conduct, not a pay status: training to the standard, using the systems you have, preparing for the hazards in your district and owning your mistakes. Plenty of volunteer firefighters and officers already live that. The fire service should expect the same from everyone who answers the call.
Now, here’s how our responsibilities break down across non-chief ranks and tiles:
- Firefighters: Act like professionals. Show up to training, including the sessions on accountability. Hang your tag every time, even on a call that looks routine. Know your breathing apparatus and PPE well enough to catch a problem before the alarm. When a building or process looks unfamiliar, ask what is inside before you flow water. Speak up to your officer when something looks wrong. Being unpaid is a reason to be proud of the work, not a reason to treat the standard as optional.
- Chiefs and company officers: Lead like professionals. You decide whether an accountability system is used or just exists. Set the expectation, enforce it at every incident and drill it with mutual-aid partners until it is automatic. Write preplans for target hazards instead of trusting walk-throughs to live in someone’s memory. Get facility experts into command early. Track training and PPE honestly, and tell the town or county board plainly what the department can and can’t safely do with the resources it has. And when a department isn’t equipped for an operation, have the discipline to say so.
- Towns and counties: Fund the standard. Elected officials who expect a fire department to protect the community owe it the training time and equipment to do so. That is the kind of support the state says it is now offering, and the right answer to a resource gap is to close it, not to excuse it.
What chiefs can do now
Let’s carve out a special section for the chiefs, as the buck stops with them. Start with accountability across department lines. Drill it with your mutual-aid partners, including members who arrive in personal vehicles and crews who show up after the first-due is already committed. Time how long it takes command to say who is missing.
Write preplans for the target hazards in your response area. NIOSH’s recommendations say a useful plan should identify silo type and contents, combustible dust hazards, water supplies, collapse zones, facility contacts and tactics that must not be used. A walk-through that lives in someone’s memory is not a plan.
Ask facility owners whether they have completed a dust hazard analysis and how that information reaches responders. Then put a knowledgeable facility representative into command early, so the people who know the building are part of the decision-making.
Do the work
Maine made a reasonable choice to put resources ahead of penalties. The fire service now has to make an equally reasonable one: Treat the waived fine as an invitation to do the work, not a pardon for having skipped it.