Many in the fire service today are too young to remember much about the 1983 U.S. invasion of the island nation of Grenada. I remember it well, although I admit I never completely understood it at the time. I was therefore glad to have the opportunity to recently read an analysis of the operation published in 2000 by the Naval Historical Center.
The stated objectives of the invasion were to stabilize a nation that had been affected by a coup and presidential assassination, and to evacuate several hundred Americans, mostly medical students, who resided on the island. The operation was very quickly planned and executed in October 1983.
The objectives of the operation were fully met, although the outcome was never really in doubt. Even considering the presence of several hundred Cuban personnel, the Grenadian military was no match for the power of the American armed forces.
Still, there were problems that led to miscommunication, delays, and loss of life. Specifically, the report states:
- Joint operations were at times ineffective due to poor communication and the fact that different military branches had different cultures and didn’t speak the same language.
- Key people who should have been involved in planning and execution were excluded.
- Confusion arose when individuals tried to operate outside of established practices and procedures.
- Secrecy and compartmentalization during the planning process led to significant logistical problems during implementation.
- A lack of unity of command led to confusion and overburdening of individuals within the system.
Fireground parallels
Does this sound at all familiar?
The invasion of Grenada was an operation of limited duration that was very quickly put together. Most fire department responses are similar in how they are executed. Fire department response is all about speed and effectiveness, but sometimes problems arise that are very much in line with what the after-action analysis found to be true in Grenada.
The report states: “Although time was pressing, the real issue in preparing the intervention was not so much the lack of planning time but the lack of quality planning in the time available.”
Most fire chiefs around the world have probably said something similar at some point in their careers.
The report continues: “An extremely short time period for planning requires full disclosure and absolute coordination rather than the opposite. The absence of these attributes on multiple levels was, as one officer observed, the crux of the problem.”
Reluctance to communicate
Problems with communications meant that intelligence that was fairly easily obtained was not shared among all on the ground. This led to redundant efforts, loss of civilian lives, and even friendly fire incidents.
A lack of transparency in the operation also seriously affected media relations and reporting. An executive decision was made to deny media representatives access to the operation through the third day of ground activity.
This decision was justified by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs as being necessary due to the speed of planning for the operation. However, excluding the media in this way led to a firestorm of criticism and reporting that focused on accusations of censorship and cover up.
It’s another good lesson for fire chiefs. Just because an operation happens quickly and with limited planning time, you ignore the media at your own peril.
Another avoidable problem with the Grenada operation resulted from the exclusion of the XVIII Airborne Corps from the planning and operational chain of command. No reason was given for this omission in the official report, but the result was significant problems for the 82nd Airborne Division, who counted on the XVIII Airborne for communications, logistics, and coordination functions.
Risk vs. benefit
Fire service leaders also sometimes find themselves in the same situation. Incident commanders may overlook key resources in some cases, or may not even be aware of them. In other instances, the factors leading to the exclusion of individuals or groups may be less benign, such as a history of bad blood or overt competition with other agencies.
The best leaders look at the big picture and call for all the resources at their disposal that can contribute to effectiveness. And they build relationships with those entities long before they are actually needed.
In the end, many of the problems with the Grenada operation were due to speed. A decision was made to go forward even acknowledging that delaying the invasion might have allowed for plans to be better formulated.
According to the report, Admiral McDonald weighed opportunities against risks in moving forward — preferring that the Grenadians and Cubans have less time to organize a defense, even if it meant less time to coordinate resources on the other side.
Risk vs. benefit — it’s the basis of every decision on the fireground. But even when speed is of the essence, it is important to remember that key lesson from Grenada: it’s not so much the lack of planning time for any given operation, but the quality of planning in the time that is available.
