Imagine the horror: A monster storm approaches your sea-level community, surging walls of water coming closer and higher with every moment. There is no high ground to escape to. And if you don’t evacuate well before the storm arrives, your only protection will be levee walls and 36 inches of elevation. Unfortunately, thousands of New Orleans residents don’t have to imagine the horror, they’ve lived it at least twice.
The city of New Orleans is divided into 17 political wards, with each ward made up of multiple districts. The area officially recognized as the 9th Ward in 1852 was originally a cypress swamp that also supported sugar cane fields along the nutrient-rich Mississippi River. In the mid-1800s, the area began to add residential development, mostly at an elevation of approximately 3 feet above sea level.
In the 1920s, the 9th Ward was geographically split with construction of the Industrial Canal. The area south (or seaside) of the canal became known as the Lower 9th Ward, while the area north was commonly referred to as the Holy Cross area (still the 9th Ward) in reference to Holy Cross High School. Although a portion of the ward sits as low as 4 feet below sea level, the majority of the populated areas are about 3 feet above sea level.
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But on Aug. 29, 2005, neither the levees or canals, nor the 3-foot elevation, along the Lower 9th Ward was any match for Hurricane Katrina. The storm made landfall as a Category 3, but the subsequent 20-foot storm surge was comparable to a Category 5 event, causing catastrophic flooding throughout the area.
History repeats itself
In the study of emergency management, it is unfortunate to learn that 2005 wasn’t the first time the 9th Ward succumbed to the ravages of a hurricane. While this month marks the 20th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina striking New Orleans, Sept. 9 will mark the 60th anniversary of Hurricane Betsy striking the same area. Betsy flooded an estimated 164,000 homes, most of them in the 9th Ward, and claimed the lives of 76 individuals. Betsy was the first storm in the United States to top $1 billion in damages (approximately $10 billion in 2025 dollars), having saturated the ward for 10 days before subsiding.
President Lyndon Johnson visited the disaster site within a couple days and ordered federal assistance for Louisiana. Betsy was the impetus for the Hurricane
Protection Program (today’s iteration being the Hurricane Safety Program), leading to levee improvements by the Army Corps of Engineers. It is important to recognize that when Betsy struck, there was no FEMA.
The formation of FEMA
Although the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s origins can be traced back to the first federal disaster relief act in 1803, it wasn’t until 1979 that FEMA was recognized under President Jimmy Carter. In 1978, the National Governor’s Association requested that President Carter consolidate the numerous federal agencies responsible for emergency functions. In response, President Carter signed Executive Order 12127, effective April 1, 1979, which formally established the FEMA as an independent agency.
Executive Order 12127 activated Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, establishing FEMA and transferring functions from other agencies and offices to the new agency. This order consolidated disaster-related responsibilities from various entities, including the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred from the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Executive Order 12148, signed on July 20, 1979, further outlined FEMA’s mission covering emergency management and civil defense.
Federal support
From the beginning, FEMA’s mission has been to “coordinate the federal government’s role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from all types of disasters, both natural and man-made.” The varied interpretation of “the federal government’s role” certainly contributes to the organizational quandary we are witnessing today. As part of this broader discussion, it is important to recognize that FEMA’s authorities and responsibilities have expanded multiple times through various federal-level changes:
- 2001: Formation of the Department of Homeland Security after the September 11 terrorist attacks — President George Bush
- 2006: Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act — President George Bush
- 2013: Sandy Recovery Improvement Act — President Barack Obama
- 2018: Disaster Recovery Reform Act — President Donald Trump
It is easy to presume through the fog of numerous acts that the accumulated responsibilities may (or may not) exceed the original intent of FEMA as a support function. And I recognize that some individuals have alleged federal overreach, corruption and incompetence, resulting in distrust of today’s agency. Far more recognizable to me are the many examples of successful coordination that have saved countless lives and protected great swaths of property. Have there been problems? Absolutely. I challenge folks to show me one department/agency that has not seen its share of problems.
With this as our backdrop, let’s look back at the White House after-action report for the Hurricane Katrina response. Remember, FEMA was nested under the DHS after 9/11. The While House report documenting Katrina lessons learned captures the intent of FEMA’s position in the emergency response continuum:
Chapter 2: National Preparedness — A Primer: “Disaster response in America traditionally has been handled by State and local governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role. Limits on the Federal government’s role in disaster response are deeply rooted in American tradition. State and local governments—who know the unique requirements of their citizens and geography and are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions—will always play a large role in disaster response. The Federal government’s supporting role respects these practical points and the sovereignty of the States as well as the power of governors to direct activities and coordinate efforts within their States. While we remain faithful to basic constitutional doctrine and time tested principles, we must likewise accept that events such as Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, require us to tailor the application of these principles to the threats we confront in the 21st Century. In later chapters, as we discuss the breakdowns in delivering Federal support and capabilities in response to Hurricane Katrina, the need for a flexible Federal response and a larger Federal role in catastrophic contingency planning becomes clear.”
FEMA’s support role is most certainly demonstrated in the interstate needs across the country, especially during the preparation for, response to and recovery from multiple large-scale disasters. Unfortunately, we have seen that nuances between political parties and ideologies repeatedly threaten a coordinated response across state borders. That chaos and conflagration is the very thing FEMA is designed to help coordinate and quench.
Then and now: State and local response vs. federal response
Some people have derided the FEMA response to Hurricane Katrina, while others blame the state and local governments for real or perceived failures in the response. While I won’t dive down the many rabbit holes there, let’s look at who’s responsible for what, and where our expectations should rest.
The key to FEMA’s role is demonstrated in past and current disaster management. The organization of the entire emergency management framework provides the backbone to provide support across state lines. The patchwork of FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams has proven its functional, operational and life-saving worth multiple times over. While the teams are made up entirely of local resources, the function of prepositioning and deploying the teams across states borders requires centralized federal coordination to avoid local and state ideologic chaos.
The local, state and federal responders were faced with overwhelming needs during Katrina. My observations from afar include a sense of dysfunction and distrust between local/state authorities and the responsibility of the federal government. While some will debate the Katrina response for years, the fact will remain that FEMA was never supposed to be “in charge,” per se. In reality and under the FEMA doctrine, that event, as all events do, began local and stayed local, with federal support. There were successes and failures — the details of which fill our many public and private AARs.
Moving forward
There is work to do, and there are changes that need to be made. I believe the role of federal financial disaster assistance related to the insurance industry needs a lot of work. I have personally volunteered for FEMA disaster assessment teams in response to 2024’s Hurricane Helene assault on the west coast of Florida. During this time, I spoke to residents who had successes with FEMA assistance, and I spoke to many more who did not. Is this a FEMA problem? A state coordination problem? Those people don’t care, and we shouldn’t either. We need to define and streamline the process to manage expectations, regardless of what state the next disaster strikes.
There are also parts of the process that are successful and need additional support. I believe USAR is a solid, proven concept. Further, it is reasonable to expect that the aforementioned role of prepositioning assets across state lines requires federal coordination. Leaving that coordination to some mythical belief that the states will always agree is nonsensical.
The constant barrage of political rancor makes it difficult to establish a clear comparison of FEMA’s capabilities today versus in 2005. As I began writing this article, the very clear intent from President Trump and DHS Secretary Kristi Noem was that FEMA would be eliminated. As disasters continue to occur and the thoughts continue to evolve, so too has the message to the public. After the devastating and deadly Texas floods in early July, Secretary Noem said in a “Meet The Press” interview on July 13, “I think the president recognizes that FEMA should not exist the way that it always has been. It needs to be redeployed in a new way, and that’s what we did during this response.”
Closing thoughts
Expecting that FEMA will solve all your problems is as nonsensical as thinking the 50 states have equal capacity and capability to handle disaster management alone or in similar manner. It is unfortunate that politics is intertwined in emergency response, but here we are. Emergency response should be apolitical.
The requirement in place in July for the head of DHS to approve all contracts over $100,000 has already had profoundly negative impacts, as reported in slowed USAR response to the Texas floods. It has been reported that an internal memo requires extensive information and justifications and further warns that approvals could take up to five days. Beyond training and funding, the cornerstone of USAR and FEMA performance effectiveness has become the ability to preposition resources in a timely manner. Any delay, especially one that takes days, is likely to cost lives, increase costs and decrease efficiency.
To the question, how would FEMA respond today as compared toKatrina in 2005? It depends on which policy gets in the way today. I am concerned that the insanity of our past failures sits on the horizon of our next disaster. Although we have identified many problems, we have apparently not learned the lessons.