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How interoperability issues hindered police, fire response to a deadly wildfire

A review of the Chimney Top fire response reveals how interoperability and communications breakdowns contributed to the fire’s devastation

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As the event escalated, it quickly became apparent that communication would become a challenge.

Photo/AP

By Keith Padgett, FireRescue1 Contributor

On Nov. 23, 2016, a wildland fire was discovered in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, in what is commonly referred to as the Chimney Top trail area. This was the second wildland fire within the past 10 days on Chimney Trail.

Park personnel chose an indirect attack control tactic to contain the fire. Over the next few days, the fire began to grow due to drought conditions described as “critically dry,” with humidity never rising above 40 percent.

Even with massive firefighting efforts deployed, the fire grew to over 35 acres by Nov. 27. The next morning, strong winds had helped the fire spread outside the containment area. Over the next two days, the fire traveled into the city of Gatlinburg and to the edge of the city of Pigeon Forge.

When finally brought under control, the fire had burned over 17,000 acres and damaged approximately 2,500 structures. Three people lost their lives in Gatlinburg and there were 11 reported deaths in Sevier County, Tennessee.

Interoperability issues, evacuations hampered communication

A natural disaster such as this can be devastating for any community, but one at this level was especially overwhelming to the Sevier County area. As the event escalated, it quickly became apparent that communication would become a challenge, as resources from 50 counties, over 225 agencies, 445 apparatus and 3,535 first responders were deployed.

The After Action Review commissioned by Sevier County and the city of Gatlinburg noted several communications breakdowns, including, “cell phone communication outages contributed to a delay of the public broadcast of the evacuation message for Gatlinburg.” And, because this was a “non-weather emergency message; the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) could not be used for this evacuation.”

In an attempt to work around communications issues, the report noted that after the evacuation notice was given “police, fire and mass transit personnel were sent door-to-door in many areas to evacuate citizens and visitors despite being severely challenged by downed trees; intense fire; downed power lines; and loss of power, landline phones, and internet and cellphone service.”

The After Action Review identified the following disaster response communication issues:

  1. Busy signals: At times, the radio communications related to the fire and response overloaded the Sevier County radio system. Some busy signals occurred due to the abundance of radio traffic and the lack of available radio frequencies for the Gatlinburg Police Department.
  2. Frequency and channel interoperability: Communication between departments became an issue due to a lack of interoperability between radio frequencies and channel allocation.
  3. Inaudible communication: Communication was hampered due to the fire intensity and high winds – at times, field personnel could not hear voice commands over the radio due to background noise.
  4. Communication interruptions: Critical communication links between the city of Gatlinburg Emergency Operations Center and Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) were significantly interrupted and contributed to TEMA not sending the requested Integrated Public Alert and Warning System notifications to evacuate Gatlinburg.
  5. Mutual aid interoperability: Insufficient radio interoperability among city, county, state and federal agencies created critical obstacles to direct communication. Mutual aid responding agencies were unable to communicate with one another and the established Emergency Operations Center or the Gatlinburg Police Department Communications Center. According to the report, these issues “forced all communications to go through the Gatlinburg Dispatch Center and later through the Sevier County 911 Emergency Communications Center.”
  6. Critical resource relocations: The original Emergency Operations Center and other city official offices had to be evacuated, and relocated to another location in Gatlinburg during the height of the wildfire response.

Train together for coordinated disaster response

The well-established relationship between local responders and the community did help overcome many of the existing communication struggles. Most of the responders had operated or trained together before the fire and were able to develop a coordinated common goal. Even with communication concerns during the event, overall control of the situation remained intact and the responders maintained the ability to function.

In situations where responders don’t have established relationships with the community, the report stated the need to “create redundancy in critical messaging and communications with state and federal agencies” in an effort to fill the gaps of missed communication.

Preparation for natural disasters

Emergency responders should prepare for events such as this one that may overwhelm their normal everyday operations.

  • When an emergency operations center is staffed, ensure that key decision makers from all agencies involved are represented.
  • There should be a backup EOC if possible, at what may be a safe location away from the event. If the incident becomes so large that the EOC has to be moved, a continuity of operations must be maintained.
  • The communications system in a local district should also be evaluated to determine what it can handle and when it will require a second or enhanced system to be stood up. This evaluation should include backup power to the EOC and other system components, such as repeaters and computer servers.
  • In case of a disaster this large, consider the continuity of local government, as the city of Gatlinburg was totally evacuated during the fire. A safe location must be established to continue operation of all vital services at all levels.
  • It is highly recommended that municipalities conduct emergency tabletop exercises and then move to full-scale drills to allow all departments to operate together and communicate with one another. Make this an annual event that always expands to test the system to make it stronger.
  • Mutual aid responders unfamiliar with the area found it difficult to search for victims without GPS or cellphone service. The report found “a mobile communication capability is vital to providing the agility needed to address the dynamics of a massive, complex, and deteriorating emergency situation.”

Often, local agencies are comfortable operating at a level they believe they can manage. Training together for a large-scale natural disaster not only examines the city or county’s capabilities and identifies potential weak spots in communication and coordinated response, but also builds those relationships that will benefit everyone.

Train for the unknown.

About the author
Chief Keith Padgett serves as the Fire and Emergency Medical Services academic program director with Columbia Southern University, as well as fire chief of the Beulah Fire District in Valley Alabama. Keith, a 37-year member of the fire service, has completed the Executive Fire Officer Program through the National Fire Academy. He holds a Master of Science degree in leadership with an emphasis in disaster preparedness and executive fire leadership, as well as the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) designation. Keith currently serves as a Specialty Educational Board member for the IAFC Executive Fire Officer Program Section.

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