USFA highlights lessons learned from Minn. bridge collapse

By Cristi Laquer
FireRescue1 staff

AP Photo/Jacob Reynolds A water rescue boat is seen near the wreckage of the Interstate 35W bridge after the collapse.

EMMITSBURG, Md. — The response to last year’s bridge collapse in Minneapolis demonstrated the “extraordinary value” of interoperability training, according to a report released Monday by the U.S. Fire Administration.

Thirteen people died and about 100 were injured when the eight-lane Interstate 35W bridge buckled during evening rush hour on Aug. 1.

In its report into the incident and subsequent response by emergency personnel, the USFA highlighted both positive and negative elements to help other departments cope with similar challenges in the future.

“To the nation’s firefighters, collapse of structure is something for which they all plan and prepare, USFA Administrator Greg Cade said. “The uniqueness of this bridge collapse, and the challenges faced by firefighters and their command staffs, offers an opportunity for firefighters across this nation to learn from the Minnesota response to this event.”

The incident posed unique challenges to first responders because of its physical and jurisdictional complexity, the report said Victims were trapped on various sections of the bridge and fell onto the river banks and into the water itself; the site posed threats of secondary collapse and hazmat contamination.

The bridge, a section of interstate highway, was owned by the federal government but operated by the state of Minnesota. After the collapse, it lay partly within city limits and partly in the water, where the county Sheriff’s Water Patrol has jurisdiction.

But these and other difficulties were smoothly overcome because of “the excellent working relationships that had been developed through joint interagency training, planning, and previous emergency incidents,” according to the USFA’s investigation.

Local leaders had attended a 2002 FEMA course in integrated emergency management, which they credited as a major factor in their preparedness level, the report said. This course led the city to spend more than $30 million to improve interoperability and create special operations teams including hazardous materials and collapse structure teams.

All city employees were also offered training in Incident Command Systems, and their improved understanding aided smooth operations after the bridge collapse, according to the report.

Notable successes
The USFA’s report identified several notable successes in Minneapolis’s response to the bridge collapse.

First responders and mutual aid companies were extremely well prepared to work together. “Key players not only knew each other, but were familiar with the operations and disaster assignments of others,” the report said. “When it came time to pull together efficiently as a team, they did.”

Technology, including a recently acquired 800 MHz radio system, streamlined communications and provided real-time situational awareness. Emergency personnel interviewed for the report stated that the radio system “saved our lives,” was “fantastic,” and “incredible.” Video cameras installed on the bridge were used to monitor the scene at a remote Emergency Operations Center.

Response was rapid and included engineers who were able to evaluate the stability of the bridge and the chances of further collapse, the report added. At one point, instability was suspected and fire commanders were able to evacuate responders until the area was deemed safe.

The report went on to praise the rapid and well-organized medical response, and said EMS responders used an effective command structure and were equipped for “surge.”

Lessons to learn
While the report generally praised the efforts in responding to the collapse, it also highlighted several areas for improvement.

Fire and police responders initially worked from separate command posts and although they maintained radio communication, they did not have a unified command until after rescue was completed. A single command post would have provided a single contact point for EMS personnel, the report claimed.

In addition, no safety officer was formally appointed, which may have contributed to risky behaviors on the part of first responders. EMS personnel did not evacuate the bridge when it was thought to be unstable, possibly because of failed communications, or possibly because they refused to leave victims, the report added

The small size of the Emergency Operations Center also contributed to confusion, the report said, and the USFA recommends communities plan for MCIs by having larger or secondary EOCs available.