On Nov. 25, 2025, our companies dispatched to a reported commercial building fire. The incident occurred simultaneously with an unrelated hazmat incident that was unfolding approximately one mile away from the fire — a factor that impacted staffing and resources on the commercial fire.
For context, my organization is a career fire department in southwest Ohio, about 20 miles north of Cincinnati. We staff five firehouses and respond to approximately 9,000 calls per year, including EMS incidents. We staff three engine companies, one tower ladder, one 100-foot ladder truck and three ALS ambulances, with each shift commanded by a battalion chief. Additionally, we house a hazmat unit and a technical rescue truck. Each fire apparatus has a minimum of three personnel on it, with ambulances staffed by two cross-trained firefighter/paramedics.
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We respond to many working fire incidents, including commercial building fires. But while these incidents are nothing new for us, this one posed a unique challenge — and it’s important to share our lessons learned.
Hazmat response
Around 1500 hours, crews were dispatched for oil leaking into a nearby waterway. Engine 71, Engine 74, Engine 72, Tower 73, Hazmat 73 and Medic 74 responded, along with Battalion 70. Numerous other chief officers responded as well, including myself (Chief 74).
As units began arriving on scene, we were alerted to a commercial building fire nearby. Our alarm assignment varies based upon occupancy type; we send different resources for a single-family dwelling versus a commercial building versus an apartment or mid-rise building. Our CAD system recommended the correct number of units: five engine companies, three ladder companies, three medic units and command officers. Responding units quickly determined that the hazmat incident would not require many resources outside of one company and therefore began diverting to the fire.
Structure fire response
The structure was an 80,000-square-foot single-story building of Type 2 construction built in the 1970s. It was originally an armory plant to upfit various vehicles such as limousines, SUVs and armored personnel carriers. When that business closed, a new business moved in. That business manufactured insulation for vehicles that went between the vehicle’s floorboards and the frame.
Our companies were familiar with the building due to numerous fire inspections over the years, as well as several small machinery fires. The building was sprinklered.
Offensive strategy
I arrived first on the scene and noted heavy black smoke pushing from the Delta side of the building and the Alpha/Delta corner. Initially, it appeared there may be a fire inside of a tractor-trailer backed against the loading dock doors located along the Delta side of the property.
Due to storage piles around the building and semi-trucks parked, I was unable to complete a 360. I was able to note smoke from the Charlie/Delta corner, and when I repositioned from the Delta side to the Alpha side, I noted smoke from the Alpha/Bravo corner. I called for a second alarm due to the volume of smoke and anticipated fire conditions, established command and declared an offensive strategy.
Lesson 1: Large columns of smoke from multiple areas were observed. This was not a typical fire for what we have been on before.
My first engine arrived and positioned on the Delta side for fire attack. They deployed a 2½-inch attack line and advanced into the building. I reinforced them with the next arriving company because we all know that advancing a 2½ is hard work.
Due to the hazmat run, the first-in engine was not from this district; they were from across town. This did not play a significant factor and later ended up working to our benefit because the company officer that would have normally been there showed up later, lending valuable knowledge at the command post regarding water supply operations in the area.
I ordered the next engine to supply the fire department connection. My first engine confirmed the sprinklers were flowing, but had moderate heat and low-visibility and could not locate the seat of the fire. At that moment, the crew continued to flow water at the ceiling to try and change the interior environment. I ordered a backup line stretched to reinforce their positions.
As more units arrived, I ordered a targeted search of the attached office space because we did not know if we had an all-clear. Facility representatives were on scene, but there was a language barrier with several non-English speakers. The targeted search was completed by using tag lines for orientation, and crews reported moderate smoke and no heat in the office area. An all-clear was confirmed on the primary search.
I began positioning companies on the Bravo side of the building as well, anticipating that we may go defensive. I also placed two rapid-intervention companies into service on the Delta side, given that we had numerous crews committed to the interior of a large commercial building.
Two ladder companies were able to make exceptional positioning despite the limited access on the Delta side. One of those companies, Tower 113, was able to obtain a roof report and noted roof sagging and fire. By this point I had also sub-divided the incident by employing division officers for safety and accountability. I conferred with the Delta division supervisor, and we agreed to shift to a defensive strategy. We evacuated all personnel, ensured a personnel accountability report (PAR) and began setting up for a large defensive fire.
Defensive strategy
The strategic shift occurred during the middle of our second-alarm activation. Unfortunately, with the combination of the CAD-recommended units, our units clearing the hazmat run and the request of a second alarm, we overwhelmed ourselves with resources. Therefore, we had units arriving while we were attempting to shift strategies.
Lesson 2: Know how your CAD operates. I assumed, erroneously, that, as our units cleared a call, it would cancel mutual-aid requests. That was not the case, and we had a full two-alarms responding at once. Therefore, my request of a second alarm was actually a third alarm, which we did not realize until much later in the incident.
We confirmed with our division supervisors that all personnel were out and began flowing water using our aerial devices. Unfortunately, the building had a limited number of doors. Four dock doors were located on the Delta side, one of which was blocked by a tractor-trailer. There were two standard-sized pedestrian doors on the Delta side, two on the Bravo side and two on the Charlie side. Typically, at commercial fires, we have ample dock doors to stretch lines. However, for this incident, our access was limited.
We began a recon to try and locate the best access to attack the fire. Using drones, we were able to see high heat at the ceiling and identified fire burning on two sides of a dividing wall. The facility had a manufacturing side and a storage side, separated by a metal dividing wall. With the drones’ heat-detection ability, we could identify two separate and distinct heat signatures.
A drone is dispatched on every commercial building fire, and this was a prime example as to why. The tower-ladder operators were able to give us a report, but the drone was able to scan all areas of the roof and identify heat below. This helped us to see that we were fighting fire on both sides of the dividing wall, and neither the bravo elements or the delta elements were able to hit the main body of fire. Each would call for a knockdown, but there was still fire on the other side of them. More importantly, the drones and our firefighters drove the command team to make educated and informed decisions to keep everyone safe on the fireground.
Lesson 3: Use technology to your benefit. Drones were absolutely crucial to get a good vantage point and continuous ongoing size-ups of the roof, without putting personnel at risk.
Simultaneously, our firefighters on the ground began forcing doors to locate the best areas to attack the fire from the exterior but were unable to identify a clear path.
I ordered all companies to remain defensive as we formed a plan for the fire. I also ordered that ventilation be controlled, as we knew the sprinkler was operating, albeit ineffectively. We felt that the fire was not getting worse, but the water could lead to the collapse of rack storage systems. We were also trying to determine what was burning, as that was not something we had experienced previously at this building.
We began to experience water supply issues due to the volume of water being injected into the building. We dispatched a water representative, who explained that we were at the end of the county system and therefore could not boost pressure or volume. Two hydrants were being utilized, and both only produced approximately 900 gpm on the same grid.
To manage this issue, we developed a plan for two other hydrants and more water. We also staged incoming apparatus into a Level 2 staging area away from the scene to not clog up the incident. Unfortunately, both hydrants were across the street, blocking access to the building. Two apparatus tied into private hydrants on other properties, which worked.
Lesson 4: Think outside the box. We brought a water representative to the scene and then sourced from other commercial properties — not something we normally would do.
With limited access and inability to get positive water on the fire, I met with my division officers to develop a new plan. We agreed to saw into the building and create openings to direct water. Using aerials and tower ladders, we placed members into positions to create large holes with rotary saws. These access points allowed for water to be directed into the space, which made a significant impact on the fire. After approximately 4 hours, we deemed the fire under control.
We began ventilation operations using a large fan truck owned by the Cincinnati Fire Department (Vent-21). They cleared all smoke out of the structure over the next hour so we could identify structural integrity, identify fuel packages, determine exactly what was burning and get information that we desperately needed.
Once the ventilation was complete, we began using our third-alarm companies to dig out the scene. We also fed our responders using the Red Cross Canteen services. The volume of product was immense and continued to burn. Each time a space was made to move the product, the fire would flare up with the new influx of oxygen. The decision was made to bring in heavy equipment, including a skid-steer and a tele-handler.
Lesson 5: Know your resources. We used mutual-aid units, specialized resources including our Emergency Management Agency, a powerful vent truck and an air-and-light unit for this fire.
Overhaul
The skid-steer and telehandler worked to shovel and push the insulation outside where the tower-ladder was able to deluge it. Heaping mounds began to accumulate outside, and a track-hoe was brought in to move the piles away from the building. The tower-ladder was also instrumental, along with the drones, to confirm no further extension or warping of the roofline, allowing us to make an educated and informed decision about letting crews back on the interior.
We began demobilizing fire companies down to our department’s resources as the hours went on. At 0500 we began preparing a plan for a crew swap because we change shifts at 0600. By 0700, we had our initial companies remaining on scene, swapped out with a new shift of firefighters, and by 0745 we had the fire out.
Investigators from the county arson team and the state fire marshal’s office began their investigation into the cause of the fire. A large after-action presentation was created and presented for training and lessons learned.
Final thoughts
It’s important as an incident commander to realize when you are simply outgunned. This fire appeared to have a large head start based on the smoke conditions from a sprinkler-controlled building on arrival. I had well-trained firefighters (arguably, some of the best!) make an initial push with a large-caliber line with little effect. I had a sprinkler system supplied from a separate engine in conjunction with my fire attack. I had a second line deployed. And still, none of it mattered. The building was simply too big, with too much fire involvement. Once we completed a targeted search and all-clear, it was absolutely time to shift strategies.
As chief officers, we owe it to ourselves to have contingency plans in place. Fortunately, we did and we were able to use them. We have great relationships with neighboring departments to get heavy equipment and operators to the scene, and we were able to do a crew swap. If you don’t have those plans, begin to form them today.
This was a tough and stubborn fire, but we extinguished it in a safe and calculated manner to ensure that everyone was able to go home.
| WATCH: Offensive vs. defensive fire attack. Understanding the tactical, structural and safety factors that drive offensive vs. defensive decisions.
