Most firefighters train for the mayday they hope never to call. But that training is only as good as what we know about how maydays actually unfold, and for years, much of that knowledge has come from a small body of research.
Orlando Lieutenant Bassel Ibrahim is carrying forward mayday research with the launch of the Firefighter Mayday Survey. The project is a variation and continuation of Don Abbott’s Project Mayday, following Abbott’s death in 2022.
The First 100 Report — authored by Chief Ed Griffin, Dr. Lindsay Judah, Chief Aaron Heller, Chief Jim Crawford, Chief Walter Lewis and Lt. Seth Major — compiles objective data from real maydays and near misses. Its stated goal is to improve firefighter safety, training and fireground tactics.
The report is a data set, not a narrative. It offers statistics rather than case stories or recommendations, so the lessons below are our reading of the numbers, not necessarily conclusions from the report’s authors.
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The typical mayday
The profile is remarkably ordinary. 73% of the maydays in this report happened in residential homes, 77% of them wood-frame, 88% were one- or two-story structures, 54% had basements, and 92% were unsprinklered. No high-rise incidents were reported. Also, 94% began as offensive operations, and 44% presented with smoke showing but no visible fire on arrival.
Falling through a floor was the leading cause at 31%, followed by becoming lost or disoriented (23%), structural collapse (18%) and being cut off or overrun by fire (10%). This highlights a common theme in traumatic firefighter deaths inside structure fires: hidden fire below, deteriorated floors and zero visibility.
Reports of those conditions came in before the mayday. Responders described “zero visibility” 34 times, “fire below us” 20 times, “holes in the floor or floor collapse” 20 times and “fire above our heads” 19 times. These are the red flags crews saw and reported, often well before anyone was in distress.
Nearly two-thirds (65%) were assigned to interior fire attack and 23% to primary search, the two assignments that put crews deepest into the structure.
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Found fast and in good shape
Related to the condition of firefighters experiencing mayday events, 84% of firefighters were conscious and alert when found, 94% still had their SCBA mask on and 87% were ambulatory. As for location, 82% were within three minutes of the mayday call, 81% were extracted within three minutes of being found, and 61% were out within three minutes of the call. Additionally, 90% were found in the same area they declared, and 85% had a flowing hoseline in place when the mayday went out, giving rescuers something to follow.
Self-help carried a lot of the load: 82% attempted self-rescue, and 35% completed it on their own. Another 28% were rescued by their own crew and 17% by another interior company, while 73% were removed by three firefighters or fewer, and 66% were found within 20 feet of an egress point.
Communication, tech and command problems
The data points to equipment and communication habits that are not being used the way training says they should be: 75% of the maydays were declared by radio, but 86% of firefighters did not activate the emergency button, and 88% did not activate their PASS alarm. Only 37% of firefighters in distress declared their own mayday; In 26% of cases their crew did it for them. The report also shows only about half of departments use LUNAR (Location, Unit, Name, Air, Resources), and 30% use a simpler “Who, What, Where” format. Acknowledgment was not universal: The incident commander (IC) or a chief officer acknowledged the mayday 60% of the time, dispatch 20%, and 65% of maydays were acknowledged on the first call.
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Thermal imaging shows a similar gap between having and using: 88% of rapid intervention teams (RIT) had access to a thermal imaging camera, but only 34% reported using one. Fewer than 4% of RITs used search lines, and only 49% had one or two RIT packs available. Notably, fewer than 5% of firefighters in distress needed air from the RIT, which suggests tools matter less than speed and navigation.
The heaviest burden falls on command, with 94% of maydays occurred after a formal IC was established; however, 52% of ICs were stationary in a command vehicle, and only 29% had an aide. Furthermore, 72% of ICs were running the fire operation and the mayday at the same time, and 80% kept fire operations on the mayday channel. Only 55% completed a PAR, and 47% requested an additional alarm after the mayday.
Timing is another interesting number. In 36% of cases the mayday came 19 or more minutes after the first unit arrived.
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Training and speaking up
When it comes to being prepared for mayday events, the data tells us that 76% of firefighters in distress had formal survival training, and 78% of RIT members had formal RIT training from their agency. That is a good foundation.
The weaker spots are higher up and further out. Only 42% of ICs had advanced or specialized RIT management training, and 60% of agencies do not run annual scenario-based mayday training. Dispatchers are largely left out: only 27% were included in scenario-based training and 48% were engaged with the agency’s mayday policy, and while 70 dispatchers in the sample were certified emergency dispatchers, 15 were civilians with on-the-job training only. Just 16% of agencies have a medical director guiding mayday protocols.
98% of respondents said their department’s culture allows members to speak up when they see an unsafe act. 87% have a dedicated RIT policy, and 76% use a proactive RIT model (softening the structure, staying mobile and creating egress) rather than a standby model (24%).
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The report does not explain why 88% of firefighters in distress never triggered a PASS alarm, why most didn’t use the emergency button or why a third of maydays came after 19 minutes. It also doesn’t address hesitation to declare a mayday, freelancing or leadership factors. That leaves a question every department should ask itself: If 98% of us believe we can speak up, is that showing up on the fireground? Saying “we have a culture of speaking up” and calling an early mayday under stress are very different things.
Other details hint at who is at risk: 88% of firefighters in distress were career, 65% were working with regular crews, and 79% were on regularly assigned shifts. Additionally, 57% were within the first 12 hours of a shift, and 74% had run five or fewer calls before the mayday, so fatigue from call volume does not appear to be a driver. Also, 16% were working overtime or trades.
Lessons for your next drill
Based on these numbers, here are the training priorities we would take from the report:
- Make declaring a mayday a reflex. Drill the full sequence (radio call, emergency button, PASS) until it is automatic, and use a standard format like LUNAR. Train crews to call it for each other.
- Treat the sizeup red flags as triggers. Zero visibility, fire below, soft floors and fire overhead showed up repeatedly. Build drills around acting on them before anyone is in trouble.
- Practice self-rescue. Most firefighters were conscious, in the same area they declared, and near a way out.
- Train the IC as a separate skill. Run annual scenario-based mayday drills that include an aide, a dedicated mayday channel and PAR practice.
- Put dispatch in the room. Include dispatchers in scenarios and mayday policy, not just the companies on the fireground.
- Use the tools you have. If a thermal imager is on the rig, make using it part of the drill.
- Check your RIT model. Decide whether you run proactive or standby and make sure staffing and equipment match.
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