As a young firefighter, I admit that I did not know why we needed so many bosses at a fire. I would often partake in snarky banter about this, plus the use of clever acronyms — my favorite being CHAOS (Chief Has Arrived On Scene). It made little sense to me as a backstep firefighter why such a large contingent of staff vehicles would arrive and sometimes just get in the way. After all, we had a great battalion chief and great company officers, so why did we need all the chiefs? Were they just so bored that they wanted to come and be a tourist at a fire?
Fast forward several years and I was promoted to lieutenant on one of our rescue pumpers. I had the fortune of making several great fires, including a nighttime multi-family apartment fire where I was put in charge of running operations on the second floor.
The fire had a pretty good start on us.My engine arrived first with heavy fire on two floors extending quickly to the attic and laterally to other affected apartment units. I completed a hasty 360 and, to my surprise, had nobody trapped on balconies. We did have one person trapped at the front door, and after assisting with his rescue, we gained control of the fire. As we pushed interior, I was reassigned to “Division 2.”We got the job done, but I had not effectively managed my company and the fire floor simultaneously. That’s when it clicked: This is why we bring other officers to our fires.
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Span of control
Most of us have had it beaten into our thick skulls that span of control is three to seven people. This doesn’t change if you’re a company officer or an incident commander. With the dynamic nature of structural firefighting (or any task), you can really only keep track of that many resources at once.
My initial-alarm assignment for an apartment fire is five engines, three ladders and three medic units. Based on common sense alone, the initial IC is overwhelmed with the 11 resources dispatched. In the fire that I briefly described above, it quickly escalated to two alarms, adding more apparatus and personnel.
My department scales up or down the response based on occupancy type, and it bases our deployment model on NFPA recommendations. We send less to a simple house fire and significantly more to a mid-rise or high-rise fire because of all the additional tasks that need to be accomplished (or potentially need to be accomplished).Those tasks are:
- Initial fire attack and water supply
- Search and rescue of all floors
- Backup fire attack and backup water supply
- Rapid intervention
- Ventilation and salvage
- EMS
- Rehab
- Adequate support personnel to reinforce items not completed
When comparing the tasks and resources required, it can become quickly overwhelming for any scene commander. If the fireground adds additional complexities — a rapid-fire event, mayday, civilian victims or a stalled stretch — then the confusion skyrockets and ability to manage collapses. A best practice way to manage the incident is to divide out the incident and give ownership to division officers.
The alpha division boss
Whether your department formally uses Blue Card command or not is a moot point. There are some good learning lessons from within the Blue Card model, based on the operations and practices of “America’s fire chief,” Alan Brunacini. One lesson is to employ chief officers to manage specific areas of the incident. Essentially, this becomes a three-tiered command system wherein:
- The company officer has accountability and task-level supervision of their crew;
- The division officer has accountability and tactical-level supervision of all the resources in their area; and
- The IC has overall accountability of all assets on scene while maintaining a strategic-level view.
This is not a new concept. Even on a battlefield, generals who are formulating strategic plans are not leading the troops directly into battle. They entrust battlefield commanders and small-unit leaders with executing the strategy and developing the tactics necessary to accomplish the mission.
Similarly, on a working fire, we quickly assign an alpha boss to manage the resources, execute the strategy and complete critical tasks. The IC can push resources to alpha division boss to accomplish the mission (fire attack, search, etc.). This cuts down on the flow of information overload to the IC, so that they can focus on the big picture. The division boss can manage 3-7 companies in their division and maintain adequate span of control.
But what if there is significant fire on the Charlie side of the building? That’s when we employ a division boss with the same concepts in mind. Now there are potentially two division officers – one on the alpha side, and one on the Charlie side, working together and funneling resource requests and information to the IC.
Multi-family and mid-rise
It makes little sense for an alpha boss to manage a multi-story building fire. It can be done, but if there are three companies of firefighters working on three different floors, then span of control is quickly exceeded. Therefore, we put our division bosses inside, one on each fire floor affected, to manage and track progress. We number our bosses by floor — the first floor is Division 1, second floor is Division 2, and so on. This allows another set of eyes on the fire floor as a safety and to ensure that crews are good. It helps with resource tracking, air management, fire progression, salvage, and all things good for the fire service.
Not every floor needs a boss. If all the action is on the second floor, employ Division 2 and keep the rest back. If fire is running all floors, then we put more bosses in place. If there is nothing going on, hold the chiefs back and only use what you need.
Where it can fail
Lesson one as a leader: Trust the work. ICs, especially those new to a system like this, have a tendency to try and drive the work to be done in a division or area. It is the IC’s job to command the incident and to give orders. It is not the IC’s job to drive every tactic and idea to the line firefighter.
For instance, a company officer arrives to a well-involved house fire, performs a size-up and initiates an offensive fire attack. They stretch a 1¾-inch attack line and go for the fire. The chief officer who arrives can either support the plan or change the plan based on observations they observe when they arrive; after all, the fire has probably changed in the minutes since initial arrival. The IC should never give orders before arriving on scene; they should trust that the leadership of the companies can execute and perform.
Similarly, once employing a division boss, the IC gives autonomy to that division boss to execute the necessary tasks of firefighting. If the IC has concern or worry, they can call the division boss and ask for an update, but they must trust that the division boss has accountability and control in their assigned area. If an IC begins ordering companies around the division boss, command can break down, and the IC is no longer focusing on the big picture. Arriving chief officers must not self-assign; otherwise, they are just another liability to track. Instead, chiefs should report to the IC that they are on scene and wait for the assignment.
All orders given by a division boss must be a task, location and objective. For instance, we cannot simply say on the radio at an apartment fire “Engine 71, take search.” Where are they searching? Are they searching where you, as the IC or division officer, want them to search? Instead, orders would say “Engine 71 from Division 2, complete a primary search on the second floor.”
Finally, as leaders we have to check the ego. It is hard to sit in a command car or at a command post and to be quiet while the crews are working. It is easy to key the mic and ask for situation updates. Instead, let the crews work. They know what to do because they are well trained and disciplined. If there is nothing to be said, then say nothing on the radio, and let the guys work.
Calm in the chaos
Having a parade of chief vehicles is not for show, nor is it time to play fire tourist or to make life miserable for the frontline firefighters. If that is the case in your organization, then there is a serious culture issue that needs addressed.
Instead, the intent of division officers is to make the fireground safer and to reduce the burden and span of control on the IC. When employed correctly, the fireground runs more smoothly. Division officers provide an extra set of eyes for safety, they track the accountability of resources in their area, and they assign their resources to cover the critical tasks needing completed (search, fire attack, overhaul, etc.). They also help to ensure that crews are changed out regularly and not overworked, and can keep a steady flow of firefighters operating at dynamic incidents.
Chief officers must be trained to operate as division officers, and must lose the ego and rank. It is not uncommon in my system to have a battalion chief as the IC, and an assistant chief or a mutual-aid chief as a division boss. Yet, because we have practiced and performed on many incidents, the IC runs it, and rank is not an issue. The IC trusts the progress reports they receive from the division, and the division trusts the work of the firefighters working under them. It creates a safer fireground while not disturbing the aggressive nature of firefighting — at least in my system.
Final CTA: I encourage you to look at your incident command structure and determine if it is calm or chaos.In my system, we were complete and utter chaos. While we aren’t perfect, our firegrounds run more smoothly with more personnel and more resources because we enable our firefighters, company officers and chief officers to integrate seamlessly in our incident command model. Otherwise, you are likely doomed to fail, because we just can’t effectively manage that many people with one single person. Find a system that works — and use it — because without strong command, we will not have smooth running firegrounds. And that can easily translate into lives and property lost, all because of ego.
