A careful reading of the two articles I’ve already written for the site will probably give an inkling of my philosophy. But I thought that it’s important to pause the discussion of strategy and tactics to fully explain where I come from.
It is my belief that while fire may behave the same way no matter where in the country it happens to break out, firefighters do not. Perhaps the biggest mistake we can make is to assume that just because a certain methodology works for the DCFD, LAFD or FDNY, it will work equally as well in small town America.
On the flip side, the second biggest mistake is to assume that somehow the fire you fight is different from those fought by everyone else. The reader must take what is being said and adjust that to fit within his/her unique set of circumstances. To facilitate that process, I offer the following distillation of what I consider to be my basic firefighting philosophy.
The larger umbrella
Firefighting is an inherently risky business and risk is a complex concept that cannot be boiled down to catchphrases. To say, “We will risk a little to save property …" really does not say much. What is “a little” and what does it mean to “risk” that. In reality, the choices we are forced to make in stressful moments do not gain much by committing such catchphrases to memory.
We exist first and foremost to save people, and we should be thinking about saving people no matter what. Importantly, the people we think about also includes us, the firefighters.
If we are to remain relevant to the public though, we must avoid becoming risk averse. That is to say that while we should not commit firefighters to the interior of a house that has been vacant for 12 years and was falling down before the fire started, we should not hesitate to make entry in order to confine an occupied house fire to the room of origin.
We must train as much as we can in advance of the emergency so that as many of our decisions as possible are automated. We should not have to think about how to get there, or which line to pull, or how to establish the water supply, or what type of building we are running. We should know all of these things in advance.
The objectives of each fire event are the same. I hope to continuously reiterate this point. Life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation are the objectives. They do not change. In larger, better-staffed departments, these objectives can be attacked simultaneously. For the smaller fire departments, choices must be made and the objectives are typically managed sequentially. Commanders, officers and firefighters must always frame how they think about fires and how they behave at fires with these objectives in mind.
I believe that there is a difference between risk and uncertainty. That distinction is important. Risk means that the potential harm is quantifiable; that I can put some type of number on it, and I can put measures in place to limit its impact. Uncertainty is all the things that we cannot know like the fact that the homeowner is storing gasoline in open containers in his bedroom right next to the chlorine tablets for the swimming pool.
Fireground operations always begin and end with an incomplete picture. There is no such thing as a universal, omnipotent perspective. We should work to continuously update the incomplete picture we begin with until either the call is over or we are relieved of duty for the day.
We know what some of the risks are and can plan for them. We know that uncertainty exists and that we cannot plan for that. The process of assessing risk begins long before the alarm is sounded and continues until we are safe at home at the end of a shift.
While choosing this way of life over all the other possibilities is noble, and while we understand the profession brings both risk and uncertainty, that does not mean that we take silly chances or that we don’t keep our eyes open. We cannot know everything but we would be foolish to ignore the things that we do know.
Communication
We transfer information through communication, and that information is critical to managing risk.
“Managing risks is a human enterprise. It success depends on risk managers’ ability (a) to anticipate behavior before, during and after potentially disastrous circumstances; (b) to assemble and integrate the expert knowledge relevant to that understanding; and (c) to provide that knowledge to those who must act on it, in a relevant, comprehensible way.” [1]
In the world of firefighting, we are all risks managers, from the newest rookie to the ranking chief. We must all try to anticipate behaviors, both of our own and our fellow firefighters and we must communicate to do so.
Simply recognizing that a risk exists is not enough. We must work to develop and refine communication strategies that maximize our ability to make a collective sense of what is happening, develop and maintain an on-going risk assessment and transmit those bits of information throughout the command structure or throughout the organization if need be.
As it is right now, we spend a lot of time talking while doing a very poor job of communicating.
Coordination
After communication comes coordination. An incident commander, a branch director or even a crew leader must make sure that unity of effort exists, that they understand both the practical reasons for a given mission and how it fits into the larger scheme of the operation.
Each unit operating must work to ensure that they help to enhance the collective effort. This notion has sometimes been called teamwork. It is about unity of effort and the idea that no one acts in their self-interests unless that self-interest fits within the strategic framework outlined by the incident commander.
It would seem that this is a moot point with regards for firefighters. We are held in high regard worldwide for our perceived ability to work as a team. However, when the veil is pulled back the politics, local rivalries, and simple pride, all seem to interfere with effective coordination on a regular basis. This must change.
I read recently the work of Washington firefighting veteran Eric Lamar. He applied the Powell Doctrine to interior firefighting operations. He noted, "… The commission of fire fighting forces to interior operations has become an automatic reflexive tactical act that often occurs without any strategic thought.” [2]
The clear implication is that things should not be this way; that firefighters should not move reflexively towards an aggressive interior attack. I disagree. I do not think there is any harm in defaulting to a certain course of action, especially if that course of action is effective and the right thing to do the overwhelming majority of the time.
However, I do believe that in order to conduct the operation as safely as possible, we will have to be well trained, well equipped, able to adjust our tactics to the available resources, think about safety constantly and be able to re-evaluate our risks continuously. And, as Mr. Lamar also notes, before we engage we must have a clear exit strategy.
I appreciate this opportunity to share my thoughts with a larger fire/rescue audience. However, I hope that each reader takes what I offer and critically evaluates the information. Some things will apply to your situation and others will not. Please be careful to note which is which.
References
1. Daniel et. al. (2006). On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina. University of Pennsylvania Press. Philadelphia. Pennsylvania
2. Eric Lamar. (2007) “Saving Our Own: The Powell Doctrine and Interior Fire Operations.http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/pdf/SavingOurOwn.pdf
