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Md. LODD report cites breakdowns in situational awareness, crew integrity

Investigators found that compromised size-up, poor risk/benefit decisions, weak crew integrity and missed 911 information all contributed to the Leonardtown incident

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Engine 11’s Initial line stretched and knocking down fire from the front steps.

Firefighter Brice Trossbach After Action Report and Improvement Plan

LEONARDTOWN, Md. — The Leonardtown Volunteer Fire Department has released a 145-page independent report on the June 2023 line-of-duty death of Firefighter Brice Clayton Trossbach, a Leonardtown volunteer and career firefighter at Naval Air Station Patuxent River.

Trossbach died after falling through a collapsing floor while crews operated above an unrecognized basement fire. The Baynet reported the department commissioned the review to help ensure St. Mary’s County’s first firefighter line-of-duty death results in systemwide safety improvements.

A third-party review team, led by Anne Arundel County Assistant Fire Chief Larry Schultz, reconstructed the incident using helmet-camera footage, radio traffic and interviews. Investigators cited video showing “a catastrophic collapse of the 1st and 2nd floors as well as the roof,” moments after fire from the basement burned through the first floor. The medical examiner ruled Trossbach’s cause of death as multiple injuries from the collapse.

The report says the problems went far beyond the collapse itself. Key officers didn’t relay critical details to the incident commander, such as visible structural damage, fast-moving fire and ineffective hose streams, leaving the incident commander without the information needed to change the plan. Investigators also note that the incident commander was task-saturated, a common LODD factor, and that there was no clearly defined command structure and inconsistent accountability on scene.

Additional major findings include:

  • Construction/conditions overlooked: The fire had extended into the basement and through structural floor/ceiling/joist systems. The investigation found that crews did not fully recognise the extent of fire travel and structural compromise.
  • Size-up and strategy deficiencies: The initial size-up and risk assessment did not sufficiently drive a decision that the fire was at an advanced stage in hidden spaces, nor that conditions were unsafe for an offensive interior attack.
  • Lack of 360-degree assessment/basement check: The report highlights that the incident commander did not complete or delegate a full 360° walk-around (including checking for basement fire involvement) before interior operations. Operating above an unchecked basement fire was flagged as extremely hazardous.
  • Crew integrity & accountability failures: Crews entered the structure under compromised conditions, with accountability and crew integrity lapses (such as crews not entering in intact teams, inadequate tracking).
  • Lack of standardized policies/system governance: The report highlights that the volunteer fire service system in the county lacked unified, enforced standard operating guidelines (SOGs), consistent training, an incident command structure and a governing body with enforcement authority.
  • Tactical errors: Among others, advancing an interior line into an environment with an unknown basement fire, undercutting structural support without recognition of the hazard and continuing interior operations after indicators of structural instability.

What firefighters need to know / actionable lessons

Here are practical takeaways for firefighters and fire officers, based on what the report emphasises:

  1. Never skip the 360 and basement check
    • On arrival, the IC (or delegate) must immediately perform a 360° assessment of the structure, including checking for a basement fire or extension. The report says operating above an unknown basement fire is “perhaps the highest risk activity” in this context.
    • If the IC cannot complete the 360 quickly, assign a company to perform it and delay interior entry until it is done.
  2. Size-up should drive strategy
    • Indicators such as heavy involvement of lower floors, voids, joist/ceiling damage mean you may be at a stage for a defensive or transitional strategy rather than an aggressive interior attack. The report underscores this.
    • Declaring strategy (offensive vs defensive) early and revisiting it when conditions change is critical.
  3. Enforce crew integrity and accountability
    • Interior personnel should stay in intact per your SOP, with face-to-face or radio/visual contact maintained. The report found violations of this principle.
    • The IC must maintain strict accountability of all crews: knowing who is in, where they are, what line, what floor.
    • If a firefighter is lost, trapped or unaccounted for, a mayday should be declared immediately.
  4. Be alert for structural collapse
    • The report notes these were present: sagging floor/joist, fire from below or in the basement, alligatoring siding, void spaces with fire involvement, heavy fire in lower levels backing up into upper floors.
    • Recognize that when fire has moved into hidden voids or under floor/ceiling systems, structural stability is compromised.
  5. Policies and training
    • Departments need written SOGs for structural fire operations, incident command/ICS, mayday/RIT, water supply in non-hydrant areas, crew accountability, etc. The lack of these in the jurisdiction was a systemic risk.
    • Training must align with national standards and command officers must be qualified to manage structural fires, water supply, collapse risk and RIT operations.
    • In volunteer systems, especially, there must be consistency across departments (especially in multi-department responses) and clarity in roles and command.
  6. Water supply and non-hydrant area planning
    • In this incident, the fire occurred in a non-hydrant area. The report recommended dedicated SOGs for water supply/large diameter hose operations in non-hydrant areas.
    • The IC should ensure that water supply logistics do not delay suppression, especially when fire may be in hidden areas and structural integrity is already compromised.

The NIOSH report of the same fire identified several contributing factors, including compromised situational awareness, ineffective risk/benefit analysis and scene size-up, and the ineffective use of appropriate strategy and tactics. Investigators also noted shortcomings in professional development, a lack of ongoing crew integrity during operations and failures in relaying critical information from the 911caller to responding units.

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Bill Carey is the associate editor for FireRescue1.com and EMS1.com. A former Maryland volunteer firefighter, sergeant, and lieutenant, Bill has written for several fire service publications and platforms. His work on firefighter behavioral health garnered a 2014 Neal Award nomination. His ongoing research and writings about line-of-duty death data is frequently cited in articles, presentations, and trainings. Have a news tip? He can be reached at news@lexipol.com.