By Ken Robinson
FireRescue1 Associate Editor
NEW YORK — A series of recommendations for fire departments focusing on high-rise fire attack operations and water supply has been released by investigators assigned to the 2007 Deutsche Bank fire that killed two FDNY firefighters.
Firefighters Joseph Graffagnino Jr. and Robert Beddia were killed on August 18, 2007, when they became trapped in maze-like conditions of the high-rise building under deconstruction.
By the end of the fire, 115 firefighters had suffered a variety of injuries — mostly respiratory and musculoskeletal — including 46 requiring medical leave.
A disconnected standpipe system and partitions set up for asbestos abatement prevented firefighters from getting water to the seat of the fire for an hour after arriving on scene, according to a NIOSH firefighter fatality report released Thursday.
Finally, the department ran an external hose line up the side of the structure to provide water — but by then, firefighters had already been inside the building for about an hour, and the two victims ran out of air as they began to operate the hose line.
Both firefighters suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a local hospital in cardiac arrest where they later died.
As a result of the investigation, NISOH recommends fire departments make sure a hose line is in place before sending firefighters into a hazardous or potentially hazardous area.
“At this point, the hose line can be charged and entry made. If the hose line doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, firefighters will still have time and space to escape,” the report said.
“In this incident, water supply was not established for a full hour into the incident, and at the time of the fatal event the victim’s hose line had just been charged.”
To prepare for similar water supply issues, fire departments also need to “develop and enforce standard operating procedures to establish an alternate water supply when a high-rise building’s standpipe system is inoperable,” investigators said.
NIOSH also recommends departments have a plan, policies and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations, the report said.
The report said the risk management plan must consider the following:
(1) Risk nothing for what is already lost — choose defensive operations;
(2) Extend limited risk in a calculated way to protect savable property — consider offensive operations;
(3) And extend very calculated risk to protect savable lives — consider offensive operations
In addition, NIOSH recommends fire departments:
- Ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations,
- Train firefighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure,
- Ensure that firefighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health,
- Train firefighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus,
- Use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented firefighters to the exit,
- Conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics,
- Encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department, and
- Consider additional firefighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.
Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should also conduct research into improving and developing firefighter locator technology for high-rise structures and easy-to-use radio systems for use with SCBA, the report said.
NIOSH also says municipalities should ensure construction and demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations, and develop systems for reporting to fire departments when planning unique building construction such as deconstruction or when fire suppression systems are taken out of service.
Construction company figures Mitchel Alvo, Jeffrey Melofchik and Salvatore DePaola have pleaded not guilty to manslaughter charges related to the fire. The three played various roles, ranging from asbestos-removal foreman to site safety manager, in a laborious process of dismantling the building, which was heavily damaged and contaminated with toxic debris in the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Manhattan prosecutors say Alvo, Melofchik and DePaola knew that a vital firefighting water pipe was broken, did nothing about it and covered it up. The disabled pipe, called a standpipe, cost firefighters critical time in getting water on the flames. A decision is expected in October.