COLUMBIA, S.C. — Nearly two years after Irmo Fire District Firefighter James Muller died when a floor collapsed beneath him during an apartment fire, a NIOSH investigation has identified a series of tactical and command breakdowns that contributed to his death — and commended the department’s post-incident mental health response.
On May 26, 2023, Muller, assigned to Engine 171, was fatally trapped during a multi-alarm fire in a multi-story, lightweight construction building. Firefighters began an offensive attack and rescued at least one occupant, but a seized hydrant cap delayed water supply, according to the NIOSH line-of-duty death report.
During the fire, the third floor collapsed, trapping members of Engine 1, Rescue 1 and Engine 171. Moments later, the fourth-floor loft fell through to the second floor, burying additional crew members. A rapid intervention team rescued several firefighters, but Muller was located after approximately 45 minutes and later pronounced dead.
Among 13 recommendations issued in the report, NIOSH underscored the importance of mental health support, highlighting the department’s activation of a crisis team, peer support initiatives and mandatory counseling check-ins before personnel returned to duty.
What was the initial alarm and response?
On May 26, 2023, a 911 call reported a fire at the rear of an apartment complex. At 4:13 p.m., the communications center dispatched Engine 6, Engine 13, Ladder 7, Ladder 175, Rescue 1, Battalion 2 and Battalion 1 on the initial box alarm. Engine 1 self-dispatched to the call.
Upon seeing a large column of black smoke, Engine 6 upgraded the call to a working fire, adding Engine 2, Field 6 and Rehab 1. As the crew approached and observed heavy flames and smoke visible from a distance, Engine 6 requested a full second alarm. The upgraded response brought in Engine 171, Engine 9, Rescue 2 and Battalion 5.
Ladder 9 also self-dispatched to the call after hearing Ladder 7’s initial size-up report.
What were the initial fireground actions?
When Ladder 7 arrived, the crew reported heavy fire on Sides Alpha and Delta, with attic fire visible on Side Bravo, assuming incident command. Engine 6 found the nearest hydrant’s 4-inch cap stuck and used a smaller outlet to establish a limited water supply while Engines 2 and 13 stretched lines to a hydrant 300 feet away. Battalion 1 arrived next, took command of Division Alpha, and began directing operations, according to NIOSH. Battalion 2 soon arrived, assumed incident command, and set up the ICP at the Alpha/Delta corner but did not conduct a full 360.
Property management alerted Battalion 1 to a trapped occupant, whom E6 rescued after controlling fire in the stairwell. Engine 13 and Ladder 175, assigned to Division Bravo, advanced a 200-foot line to the third floor, where fire was spreading through the attic.
What happened prior to the collapse that trapped the firefighters?
Crews in Division Bravo were conducting fire attack and search operations across the first three floors, opening walls and ceilings to stop fire spreading through concealed spaces. Ladder 175 used a ground ladder on Side Charlie to access the last two apartments on the third floor. At 4:38 p.m., Battalion 1 assigned Engine 9 as the Rapid Intervention Crew. Minutes later, falling debris was reported on Side Charlie, prompting a warning to all crews.
At 4:43 p.m., master streams from Engine 6 and Ladder 7 were redirected to the Delta side. Engine 1 and Rescue 1 crews breached a wall from Division Bravo into Division Delta, above the original fire unit. As they advanced with a hose line, the floor began to drop and water poured in from the loft above.
At 4:44 p.m., a mayday was called as the floor partially collapsed, trapping firefighters. Seconds later, the fourth-floor loft collapsed through the third floor, landing on the second, but the sagging floor below prevented further collapse to the ground level, according to NIOSH.
How were the trapped firefighters rescued?
Rescue efforts began immediately for the four trapped firefighters from E1, R1 and E171, but confusion between divisions led crews to believe only two were involved. Ladder 9 quickly located and freed one E171 firefighter and began tunneling to reach the second, buried deeper in the debris.
At 5:07 p.m., Division Bravo reported the E1 and R1 firefighters had been removed, clearing the mayday — only then did B1 inform command that an E171 firefighter remained trapped in Division Delta. Crews from L7, R2 and L9 continued tunneling efforts.
A firefighter from L9 reached the trapped firefighter, checked his air supply, and attached a RIC air line, but had to exit due to low air. A firefighter from E1 replaced him, cut the SCBA straps, and used the drag rescue device to pull the E171 firefighter out. Despite immediate EMS care and CPR, Muller was pronounced dead at the hospital.
What are the contributing factors that led to the firefighter’s death?
NIOSH investigators identified the following key factors that contributed to the fatality:
- Size-up and risk assessment
- Personnel accountability
- Task-level management and supervision
- Risk/benefit analysis that considers building construction
- ISO
- Simultaneous interior and exterior operations
- Communications
- Mayday management
- Deployment of RICs
- Delayed fire department notification
- Pre-incident planning
- Delayed water supply
What was done to help support firefighters after the LODD?
NIOSH listed 13 recommendations in the report for fire departments to review. In the aftermath of this line-of-duty death, one recommendation was based on actions the department took to support the mental health and well-being of its members.
A state fire mental health crisis team was activated, offering free counseling to firefighters and their families. Leadership ensured all members were aware of the resources and required everyone to meet with a mental health professional at least once before returning to duty. Members were encouraged to monitor each other and report concerns. Given the high risk of trauma exposure in public safety roles, programs like this are essential to support long-term mental health and well-being, NIOSH said.
Command staff utilized telephone calls, emails, text threads and meetings with members and their spouses to ensure knowledge of and ease of access to the resources for their members and families. Although the resources were voluntary at first, the fire department required every member to check in with a mental health professional at least once prior to returning to duty. Upon return to duty, members were encouraged to look out for each other, to access mental health services whenever needed and to report concerns about fellow firefighters through the chain of command.
Niosh Final Report 202307 by Lexipol_Media_Group on Scribd
